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Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication

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  • Dino Gerardi

    (Yale University)

  • Leeat Yariv

    (UCLA)

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp827.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 827.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:827

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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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References

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  1. Forges, F., 1984. "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1984035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Dhillon, A. & Mertens, J.F., . "Perfect correlated equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1197, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1989. "Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 238-263, June.
  4. Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Penn CARESS Working Papers 7f6ff09d59945e06909ce4fa4, Penn Economics Department.
  6. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1560, David K. Levine.
  7. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2004. "Committee Design in the Presence of Communication," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm351, Yale School of Management.
  8. Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, 2000. "Are Two Heads Better Than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decisionmaking," NBER Working Papers 7909, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01.
  10. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
  11. Dino Gerardi, 2002. "Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  12. FORGES, Françoise, . "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP -914, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Doraszelski Ulrich & Gerardi Dino & Squintani Francesco, 2003. "Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-41, August.
  14. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "Deliberation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Adam Meirowitz, 2007. "Communication and bargaining in the spatial model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 251-266, January.
  2. Meirowitz, Adam, 2005. "Deliberative Democracy or Market Democracy: Designing Institutions to Aggregate Preferences and Information," Papers 03-28-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
  3. Felgenhauer, Mike & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2003. "Committees and special interests," Working Paper Series 0293, European Central Bank.
  4. Meirowitz, Adam, 2005. "Communication and Bargaining in the Spatial Model," Papers 09-20-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
  5. Cesar Martinelli, 2002. "Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?," Working Papers 0210, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  6. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2004. "Committee Design in the Presence of Communication," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm351, Yale School of Management.
  7. Elisabeth Schulte, 2006. "Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees," JEPS Working Papers 06-003, JEPS.
  8. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "Deliberation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "The Inferiority of Deliberation Under Unanimity," Discussion Papers 1360, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Ian Ayres & Colin Rowat & Nasser Zakariya, 2007. "Optimal Two Stage Committee Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 04-23RR, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  11. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "Communication in Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 059, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  12. Mike Felgenhauer & Hans Grüner, 2007. "Distortionary lobbying," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 181-195, May.
  13. Henry, Emeric, 2008. "The informational role of supermajorities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2225-2239, October.
  14. Meirowitz, Adam, 2004. "In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communciation and Voting with Private Beliefs and Values," Papers 04-06-2004, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.

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