This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information? Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics César Martinelli
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
No abstract is available for
this item.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number
122247000000000593.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML ,
plain text ,
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 12 Oct 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000593Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (David K. Levine).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1985.
"Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria? ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 708-20, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, 2003.
"Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 24-44, April.
Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003.
"Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
827, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar, 2001.
"A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 259-294, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002.
"Deliberation and Voting Rules ,"
Discussion Papers
1359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996.
"Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Gary S. Becker, 1984.
"Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs ,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
35, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
Other versions: Andreoni, James, 1988.
"Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996.
"The Swing Voter's Curse ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-24, June.
Other versions:
Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995.
"The Swing Voter's Curse ,"
Discussion Papers
1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995.
"On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-35, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997.
"Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
Other versions: Nicola Persico, 2004.
"Committee Design with Endogenous Information ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Wittman, Donald, 1989.
"Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Becker, Gary S, 1983.
"A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Ichiro Obara, 2007.
"The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions ,"
Levine's Bibliography
843644000000000137, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Ichiro Obara, .
"The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
374, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Ichiro Obara, 2008.
"The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions ,"
Advances in Theoretical Economics ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1399-1399.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2008.
"On the Benefits of Costly Voting ,"
Economics Working Papers
83, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
[Downloadable!]
Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005.
"Communicating with a Team of Experts ,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
[Downloadable!]
Minoru Kitahara & Yohei Sekiguchi, 2006.
"Aggregate Accuracy under Majority Rule with Heterogeneous Cost Functions ,"
Economics Bulletin ,
Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(25), pages 1-8.
[Downloadable!]
Dan Bernhardt & Stefan Krasa & Mattias Polborn, 2006.
"Political Polarization and the Electoral Effects of Media Bias ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Sourav Bhattacharya, 2006.
"Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections ,"
Working Papers
325, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2007.
[Downloadable!]
Valentino Larcinese, 2005.
"Electoral Competition and Redistribution with Rationally Informed Voters ,"
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1366-1366.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Access and
download statistics Did you know? IDEAS was launched in September 1997.
This page was last updated on 2008-10-11.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .