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Deliberation with Partially Verifiable Information

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Author Info
Jerome Mathis () (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

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Abstract

We analyze a model of jury decision making in which jurors deliberate before voting between a status quo and its alternative. We study the impact of the voting rule on the existence of an equilibrium where any asymmetric decision-relevant information is revealed through deliberation. Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2004b) show in a general setting that the unanimity rule (with status quo) requires stronger conditions than other rules for the existence of such an equilibrium. In this paper, we extend this work by incorporating possibilities for committee members to prove some of their private information (ability to report a certi.ed document, constraint on lying or exaggeration, etc...). We show that when individuals have ability to certify information favoring the alternative, the unanimity rule performs better than other rules in requiring weaker conditions for the existence of such an equilibrium.

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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2006-03.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2006-03

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  1. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter, 2001. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 393-421, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Klevorick, Alvin K. & Rothschild, Michael & Winship, Christopher, 1984. "Information processing and jury decisionmaking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 245-278, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 259-294, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Itzhak Gilboa & Nicolas Vieille, 2004. "Majority vote following a debate," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 115-125, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Myerson, Roger B., 1998. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 111-131, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2001. "Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 158-173, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Ulrich Doraszelski & Dino Gerardi & Francesco Squintani, 2003. "Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1084-1084. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2001. "A Model Of Expertise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 747-775, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
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  13. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Austen-Smith David, 1993. "Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-43, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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