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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 5 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 3-43
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:3-43

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