Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals, Second Version

Contents:

Author Info

  • Philip Bond

    ()
    (Finance Department, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Hülya Eraslan

    ()
    (Finance Department, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

Prior research on “strategic voting” has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e., independent of the voting rule used. We depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote, and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off. Moreover, in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposing individual better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences. In this case, unanimity is the Pareto dominant voting rule. Voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal. The proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/working-papers/07-014.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 07-014.

as in new window
Length: 53 pages
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2004
Date of revision: 02 Jan 2007
Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:07-014

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Phone: 215-898-9992
Fax: 215-573-2378
Email:
Web page: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/pier
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Strategic voting; agenda setting; multilateral bargaining;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Alliances and Negotiations," Working Papers, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance 424, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  2. Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg & Laura Sour, 2004. "Group Decision-Making in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000267, David K. Levine.
  3. Samuelson, William F, 1984. "Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 995-1005, July.
  4. Chae, Suchan & Moulin, Herve, 2004. "Bargaining among Groups: An Axiomatic Viewpoint," Working Papers, Rice University, Department of Economics 2004-01, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  5. Daniel R. Vincent, 1988. "Bargaining with Common Values," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 775, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Manelli, Alejandro M, 1996. "Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 917-42, July.
  7. Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara, 2007. "Bargaining one-dimensional social choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 627-651, November.
  8. Raymond Deneckere & Meng-Yu Liang, 2006. "Bargaining with Interdependent Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1309-1364, 09.
  9. John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 1998. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Wallis Working Papers, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  10. Kennan, J. & Wilson, R., 1991. "Bargaining with Private Information," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics 90-01rev, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  11. Cho, Seok-ju & Duggan, John, 2003. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 118-130, November.
  12. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01.
  13. Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1560, David K. Levine.
  15. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590459 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Doraszelski Ulrich & Gerardi Dino & Squintani Francesco, 2003. "Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-41, August.
  18. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Samuelson, Larry, 1987. "Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 175-92, April.
  19. Caillaud, Bernard & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 435, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  20. Evans, Robert, 1989. "Sequential Bargaining with Correlated Values," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 499-510, October.
  21. Schweizer, Urs, 1989. "Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 163-77, April.
  22. Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
  23. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Henry, Emeric, 2008. "The informational role of supermajorities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2225-2239, October.
  2. Mattias K. Polborn & Matthias Messner, 2008. "The option to wait in collective decisions," 2008 Meeting Papers 397, Society for Economic Dynamics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pen:papers:07-014. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dolly Guarini).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.