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Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibria in a one-Dimensional Model of Bargaining

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Author Info
Seok-ju Cho
John Duggan (University of Rochester)

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy in its series Wallis Working Papers with number WP23.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: Nov 2001
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Handle: RePEc:roc:wallis:wp23

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, Wallis Institute, HARKNESS 109B ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A.

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  1. Philip Bond & Hulya Eraslan, 2008. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals," Economics Working Paper Archive 547, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2004. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 02 Jan 2007. [Downloadable!]
  3. John Duggan & Seok-ju Cho, 2007. "Bargaining Foundations of the Median Voter Theorem," Wallis Working Papers WP49, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2003. "A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games," Working Papers 1163, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making," Wallis Working Papers WP45, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  6. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "One-dimensional bargaining with unanimity rule," Research Memoranda 011, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  7. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2003. "A bargaining model of legislative policy-making," Working Papers 1162, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  8. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "One-dimensional bargaining with a general voting rule," Research Memoranda 045, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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