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Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Eraslan, H.
Merlo, A.
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In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and q<=n players have to agree on a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and establish their existence. We show that for agreement rules other than the unanimity rule, the equilibrium payoffs need not be unique. Furthermore, even when the equilibrium is unique, it need not be efficient.
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number
00-05.
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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 2000Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:00-05Contact details of provider: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 269 Mercer Street 7th Floor, New York, NY 10003 Phone: (212) 998-8936 Fax: (212) 995-3932 Web page: http://www.nyu.edu/econ/cvstarr/index.html More information through EDIRC
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For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Anne Stubing).
Keywords: NONCOOPERATIVE BARGAINING VOTING RULES STOCHASTIC GAMES Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990.
" The Role of Risk Preferences in Bargaining When Acceptance of a Proposal Requires Less than Unanimous Approval ,"
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty ,
Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 135-54, June.
Okada, Akira, 1996.
"A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993.
"A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Merlo, Antonio, 1997.
"Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-31, February.
Other versions: Antonio Merlo & Charles Wilson, 1997.
"Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 39-55.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eraslan, Hulya, 2002.
"Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 11-30, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996.
"Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts ,"
Discussion Papers
1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Nicola Persico, .
""Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design with Endogenous Information'' ,"
CARESS Working Papres
99-08, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Daniel Diermeier & Antoni Merlo, 1999.
"An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures ,"
Discussion Papers
1267, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995.
"A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005.
"Bargaining and Markets ,"
Levine's Bibliography
666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Baron David & Kalai Ehud, 1993.
"The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 290-301, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007.
"Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 118-149, March.
Other versions: Montero, M., 2001.
"The nucleolus as a consistent power index in noncooperative majority games ,"
Discussion Paper
39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Philippe Jehiel & Oliver Compte, 2007.
"Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective ,"
Levine's Bibliography
843644000000000131, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski Arkadi, 2007.
"One-dimensional Bargaining with Markov Recognition Probabilities ,"
Research Memoranda
044, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
John Duggan & Seok-ju Cho, 2007.
"Bargaining Foundations of the Median Voter Theorem ,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP49, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
[Downloadable!]
Antonio Merlo, 2005.
"Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues ,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
[Downloadable!]
Alessandra Sgobbi & Carlo Carraro, 2007.
"Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty ,"
Working Papers
2007.81, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Carraro, Carlo & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2007.
"Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6424, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Carlo Carraro & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2007.
"Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty ,"
Working Papers
2007_12, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] repec:att:wimass:1920012 is not listed on IDEAS
Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2003.
"A bargaining model of legislative policy-making ,"
Working Papers
1162, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005.
"Proposal Power and Majority Rule in Multilateral Bargaining with Costly Recognition ,"
Working Papers
05-10, Duke University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004.
"Regularity of Pure Strategy Equilibrium Points in a Class of Bargaining Games ,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP37, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Predtetchinski Arkadi, 2007.
"One-dimensional bargaining with a general voting rule ,"
Research Memoranda
045, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
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