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Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective

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  • Philippe Jehiel
  • Oliver Compte

Abstract

We study collective search processes in which members of a committee decide whether to accept the current proposal or continue searching. The acceptance decision is made according to majority rule. We study which members have more impact on the decision, as well as the degree of randomness of the decision. When proposals vary along a single dimension, the acceptance set is small, and at most two members determine the outcome whatever the majority rule. When proposals vary along many dimensions, the acceptance set is large except under unanimity and all members affect the distribution of decisions. Various implications are drawn. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 843644000000000131.

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Date of creation: 22 Jul 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000131

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Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002. "Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 31-48, March.
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  3. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," Working Papers 1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Charles A. Wilson, 2001. "Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 353-370.
  5. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  6. Antonio Merlo & Charles Wilson, 1997. "Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 39-55.
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Cited by:
  1. Luca Flabbi and James Mabli, 2012. "Household Search or Individual Search: Does It Matter? Evidence from Lifetime Inequality Estimates," Working Papers gueconwpa~12-12-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  2. Ulbricht, Robert, 2014. "Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," TSE Working Papers 14-475, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  3. Kwiek, Maksymilian, 2012. "Repeating voting with complete information," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1110, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  4. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2011. "One-dimensional bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 526-543, June.
  5. Bruno Strulovici, 2010. "Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 933-971, 05.
  6. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2011. "Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda," Discussion Papers 2011-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  7. Antonio Merlo & Hulya Eraslan, 2009. "Some Unpleasant Bargaining Arithmetics?," 2009 Meeting Papers 279, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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