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Search by committee

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  • Albrecht, James
  • Anderson, Axel
  • Vroman, Susan

Abstract

We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop is made by a committee and show that a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium exists given a log concave distribution of rewards. We compare search by committee to the corresponding single-agent problem and show that committee members are less picky and more conservative than the single agent. We show how (i) increasing committee size holding the plurality fraction constant and (ii) increasing the plurality rule affect the equilibrium acceptance threshold and expected search duration. Finally, we show that unanimity is optimal if committee members are sufficiently patient.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 145 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 1386-1407

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:4:p:1386-1407

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Keywords: Search Voting Committees;

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References

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  1. McCall, John J, 1970. "Economics of Information and Job Search," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1), pages 113-26, February.
  2. Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, 2005. "Log-concave probability and its applications," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 445-469, 08.
  3. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," Discussion Papers 1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March.
  5. Lippman, Steven A & McCall, John J, 1976. "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey: Part I," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(2), pages 155-89, June.
  6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  7. Alexander Shapiro & Jos Berge, 2002. "Statistical inference of minimum rank factor analysis," Psychometrika, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 79-94, March.
  8. Vroman, S B, 1985. "No-Help-Wanted Signs and the Duration of Job Search," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(379), pages 767-73, September.
  9. Burdett, Kenneth, 1996. "Truncated means and variances," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 263-267, September.
  10. Lippman, Steven A & McCall, John J, 1976. "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 347-68, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2011. "Efficient Search by Committee," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1782, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Bulent Guler & Fatih Guvenen & Giovanni L. Violante, 2009. "Joint-search theory: new opportunities and new frictions," Staff Report 426, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  3. Hizen, Yoichi & Kawata, Keisuke & Sasaki, Masaru, 2012. "An Experimental Test of a Committee Search Model," IZA Discussion Papers 6861, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Bruno Strulovici, 2008. "Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation," Economics Series Working Papers 2008-WO8, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Flabbi, Luca & Mabli, James, 2012. "Household Search or Individual Search: Does It Matter? Evidence from Lifetime Inequality Estimates," IZA Discussion Papers 6908, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Moscarini, Giuseppe & Wright, Randall, 2010. "Introduction to Search Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1319-1324, July.
  7. Shi, Xianwen & Moldovanu, Benny, 2013. "Specialization and partisanship in committee search," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.

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