Search by committee
AbstractWe consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop is made by a committee and show that a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium exists given a log concave distribution of rewards. We compare search by committee to the corresponding single-agent problem and show that committee members are less picky and more conservative than the single agent. We show how (i) increasing committee size holding the plurality fraction constant and (ii) increasing the plurality rule affect the equilibrium acceptance threshold and expected search duration. Finally, we show that unanimity is optimal if committee members are sufficiently patient.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 145 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Search Voting Committees;
Other versions of this item:
- James Albrecht & Axel Anderson & Susan Vroman, 2007. "Search by Committee," Working Papers gueconwpa~07-07-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Albrecht, James & Anderson, Axel Z. & Vroman, Susan, 2007. "Search by Committee," IZA Discussion Papers 3137, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Susan Vroman & Axel Anderson & James Albrecht, 2007. "Search by Committee," 2007 Meeting Papers 351, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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