On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts
AbstractWhat is the optimal size of expert committees? To address this question, I present a model of a committee of experts with career concerns. Each expert may observe an argument about the state of the world but be unsure about the argument's soundness. Experts may remain silent or compete for the opportunity to announce an argument. I show that experts become more reluctant to speak in larger committees. This effect is sufficiently strong to make small groups of experts optimal. At the same time, a small committee may be superior to an individual expert.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Konstanz in its series Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz with number 2012-24.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 19 Nov 2012
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Hahn, Volker, 2012. "On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62041, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-12-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2012-12-06 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2012-12-06 (Microeconomics)
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