Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 102 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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- Baron David & Kalai Ehud, 1993. "The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 290-301, December.
- Norman, Peter, 2002.
"Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 322-353, February.
- Merlo, Antonio, 1997.
"Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-31, February.
- Merlo, Antonio, 1996. "Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment," Bulletins 7476, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October.
- V. V. Chari & Larry E. Jones & Ramon Marimon, 1997.
"The economics of split-ticket voting in representative democracies,"
582, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Chari, V V & Jones, Larry E & Marimon, Ramon, 1997. "The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 957-76, December.
- Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002. "Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 31-48, March.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Leblanc, William & Snyder, James Jr. & Tripathi, Micky, 2000. "Majority-rule bargaining and the under provision of public investment goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 21-47, January.
- Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July.
- Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990. " The Role of Risk Preferences in Bargaining When Acceptance of a Proposal Requires Less than Unanimous Approval," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 135-54, June.
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