Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Bargaining in Legislatures: An Empirical Investigation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Brian Knight

Abstract

While the theoretical literature on non-cooperative legislative bargaining has grown voluminous, there is little empirical work attempting to test a key prediction in this literature: proposal power is valuable. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across U.S. Congressional districts in 1991 and 1998. The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of the Baron and Ferejohn legislative bargaining model: members with proposal power, those sitting on the transportation authorization committee, secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives. Support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power, which are more powerful than the qualitative restrictions, is more mixed. I then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior, including partisian models, informational roles for committees, models with appropriations committees, and theories of committees as preference outliers.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10530.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10530.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: May 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10530

Note: PE
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Elhanan Helpman & Torsten Persson, 1998. "Lobbying and Legistlative Bargaining," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1837, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gérard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1737, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. McKelvey, Richard D. & Riezman, Raymond., 1990. "Seniority in Legislatures," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 725, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. V. V. Chari & Larry E. Jones & Ramon Marimon, 1997. "The economics of split-ticket voting in representative democracies," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 582, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Merlo, A., 1992. "Bargaining Over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 92-55, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  6. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
  7. Tim Besley, 2002. "Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States," IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies W02/13, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  8. Levitt, Steven D & Poterba, James M, 1999. " Congressional Distributive Politics and State Economic Performance," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 185-216, April.
  9. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 7097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
  11. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  12. Guillaume R. Frechette & John H. Kagel & Steven Lehrer, 2000. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 1515, Econometric Society.
  13. Brian Knight, 2002. "Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-out of State Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the Federal Highway Aid Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 71-92, March.
  14. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
  15. Knight, Brian, 2004. "Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods: evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 845-866, March.
  16. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-64, August.
  17. Lockwood, Ben, 1998. "Distributive Politics and the Benefits of Decentralisation," CSGR Working papers series, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick 10/98, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
  18. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  19. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2000. "Lobbying Legislatures," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics 2000-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  20. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-27, March.
  21. Baron David & Kalai Ehud, 1993. "The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 290-301, December.
  22. Leblanc, William & Snyder, James Jr. & Tripathi, Micky, 2000. "Majority-rule bargaining and the under provision of public investment goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 21-47, January.
  23. Dharmapala, Dhammika, 1999. "Comparing tax expenditures and direct subsidies: the role of legislative committee structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 421-454, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Rodet, Cortney S., 2011. "Voter Behavior and Seniority Advantage in Pork Barrel Politics," MPRA Paper 33192, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Dhammika Dharmapala, 2002. "Legislative Bargaining and Incremental Budgeting," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2002-10, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10530. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.