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Congressional Distributive Politics and State Economic Performance

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  • Levitt, Steven D
  • Poterba, James M

Abstract

States that were represented by very senior Democratic congressmen grew more quickly during the 1953-90 period than states that were represented by more junior congressional delegations. States with a large fraction of politically competitive House districts also grew faster than average. The first finding is consistent with traditional legislator-based models of distributive politics, the second with partisan models. The authors cannot detect any substantively important association between seniority, state political competition, and the geographic distribution of federal funds, so higher district-specific federal spending does not appear to be the source of the link between state economic growth and congressional representation. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 99 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (April)
Pages: 185-216

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:99:y:1999:i:1-2:p:185-216

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  1. James M. Snyder, 1994. "Safe Seats, Marginal Seats, And Party Platforms: The Logic Of Platform Differentiation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 201-213, November.
  2. Lisa Kiel & Richard McKenzie, 1983. "The impact of tenure on the flow of federal benefits to SMSA's," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 285-293, January.
  3. Chressanthis, George A & Shaffer, Stephen D, 1993. " Economic Performance and U.S. Senate Elections: A Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 263-77, March.
  4. Sam Peltzman, 1988. "How Efficient Is the Voting Market?," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 53, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  5. Wright, Gavin, 1974. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(1), pages 30-38, February.
  6. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-63, February.
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