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The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina

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Author Info
Pablo T. Spiller

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Abstract

Public policies are the outcomes of complex intertemporal exchanges among politicians. The political institutions of a country constitute the framework within which these transactions are accomplished. We develop a transactions theory to understand the ways in which political institutions affect the transactions that political actors are able to undertake, and hence the quality of the policies that emerge. We argue that Argentina is a case in which the functioning of political institutions has inhibited the capacity to undertake efficient intertemporal political exchanges. We use positive political theory and transaction cost economics to explain the workings of Argentine political institutions and to show how their operation gives rise to low-quality policies. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.

Volume (Year): 19 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 281-306
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:281-306

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  1. Emmanuel Abuelafia & Sergio Berensztein & Miguel Braun & Luciano di Gresia, 2005. "Who Decides on Public Expenditures? A Political Economy Analysis of the Budget Process: The Case of Argentina," Public Economics 0511004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Robert Deacon & Bernardo Mueller, 2004. "Political Economy and Natural Resource Use," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 01-04, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  3. Mario Bergara & Andrés Pereyra & Ruben Tansini & Adolfo Garcé & Daniel Chasquetti & Daniel Buquet & Juan Andrés Moraes, 2005. "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes: The Case of Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1805, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
  4. Manuel Palma-Rangel, 2006. "Institutions and development in Mexico. Are formal economic reforms enough?," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Ilades-Georgetown University, Economics Department, vol. 21(2), pages 83-103, December. [Downloadable!]
  5. Xosé Carlos Arias & Gonzalo Caballero, 2003. "Instituciones, costos de transacción y políticas públicas: un panorama," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 5(8), pages 117-146, January-J. [Downloadable!]
  6. Lee J. Alston & Bernardo Mueller, 2005. "Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative Exchange in Brazil," NBER Working Papers 11273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Pablo T. Spiller & Sanny Liao, 2006. "Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups' Participation in Policy Making - A Selective Survey," NBER Working Papers 12209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Carlos Scartascini, 2007. "The Institutional Determinants of Political Transactions," RES Working Papers 1072, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  9. Gerardo Uña, 2005. "El Congreso y el Presupuesto Nacional : Desempeño y Condicionantes de su rol en el Proceso Presupuestario," Public Economics 0508013, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Daron Acemoglu, 2002. "Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics," NBER Working Papers 9377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Ruben Enikolopov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," Working Papers w0065, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Sebastian Galiani & Daniel Heymann & Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "Missed Expectations: The Argentine Convertibility," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 515, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  13. Mario Bergara & Andrés Pereyra, 2005. "El proceso de diseño e implementación de políticas y las reformas en los servicios públicos," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1705, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
  14. Alvaro Forteza & Mario Tommasi, 2005. "Understanding reform in Latin America," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 2205, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
  15. Dixit, Avinash, 2006. "Evaluating recipes for development success," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3859, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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