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Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story

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Author Info
Moe, Terry M
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 6 (1990)
Issue (Month): 0 ()
Pages: 213-53
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:0:p:213-53

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  1. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto H. Stein, 2008. "Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?," RES Working Papers 4593, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  2. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto H. Stein, 2008. "Un Enfoque Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?," RES Working Papers 4594, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. Stefan Voigt, 1999. "Implicit Consitutional Change-Changing the Meaning of the Constitution Without Changing the Text of the Document," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 197-224, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen, 2000. "Term Length and the Quality of Appointments," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Lars Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2003. "Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Mansbridge, Jane, 2008. "A "Selection Model" of Political Representation," Working Paper Series rwp08-010, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
  7. Miltos Makris, 2003. "Administrative Bureaus with Standard Operating Procedures," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/062, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  8. Henk ter Bogt, 2003. "A Transaction Cost Approach to the Autonomization of Government Organizations: A Political Transaction Cost Framework Confronted with Six Cases of Autonomization in the Netherlands," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 149-186, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2004. "Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary+," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200429, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Delia M. Boylan, 2000. "Bureaucratic Delegation in Comparative Perspective: Constitutional Structure and Reform Timing," Working Papers 0003, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  11. Delia M. Boylan, 1999. "Bureaucratic Reform In Developing Countries: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Rule," Working Papers 9914, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  12. Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller, 2000. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina," Working Papers 29, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised May 2000. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen, 2007. "Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 55-69, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Lloyd Gruber, 1999. "Power Politics and the Institutionalization of International Relations," Working Papers 9922, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  15. Eric Crampton & Andrew Farrant, 2004. "Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy," Public Economics 0401002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Ajit Karnik, 2005. "Why Do Governments Lack “Political Will� An Explanation," Working Papers id:102, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
  17. Christoph Engel, 2003. "Market Definition As a Social Construction (Marktabgrenzung als soziale Konstruktion)," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2003_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  18. Mariano Tommasi, 2003. "Crises, institutions politiques et réformes politiques : le bon, le mauvais et l'affreux," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 17(2), pages 49-81. [Downloadable!]
  19. Avdagic, Sabina, 2006. "One Path or Several? Understanding the Varied Development of Tripartism in New European Capitalisms," MPIfG Discussion and Working Papers 5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. [Downloadable!]
  20. Achim Hurrelmann, 2002. "Verfassungspolitik als Konstruktion von Lernprozessen? Konstitutionalisierung und Identitätsbildung in der Europäischen Union," MZES Working Papers 51, MZES. [Downloadable!]
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