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Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina

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Author Info
Juan Pablo Nicolini
Josefina Posadas
Juan Sanguinetti
Pablo Sanguinetti
Mariano Tommasi

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Abstract

This paper examines the determinants of fiscal performance of sub-national governments in Argentina. This will be done through analysis and examination of the overall regime of incentives, through an analysis of salient episodes of `bailout` and through cross-sectional empirical analysis. The bailout episodes to be analyzed will include mostly those that occurred in the relationship between the national and provincial governments. Of primary interest will be the process that caused the crises and how both the provinces and the federal government reacted, with an emphasis on the incentives and constraints each faced. The paper will also try to explain the actual form that the bailout takes. The empirical analysis will emphasize those determinants of bailout related to the institutional design of intergovernmental fiscal institutions. Thus, the study will have direct implications regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the current institutional framework in generating sound fiscal behavior by the different levels of government.

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series RES Working Papers with number 3160.

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Date of creation: Aug 2002
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3160

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Von Hagen, J., 1992. "Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the European Communities," European Economy - Economic Papers 96, Commission of the EC, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN).
  2. Jones, Mark P. & Sanguinetti, Pablo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2000. "Politics, institutions, and fiscal performance in a federal system: an analysis of the Argentine provinces," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 305-333, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Mariano Tommasi & Mark P. Jones & Pablo Sanguinetti, 1997. "Politics, Institutions and Public Sector Spending in the Argentine Provinces," Working Papers 17, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jan 1999.
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  4. Clarke, George R.G. & Cull, Robert, 1998. "The political economy of privatization : an empirical analysis of bank privatization in Argentina," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1962, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-35, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Peltzman, Sam, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 327-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-38, April.
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  1. Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2006. "Size and Soft Budget Constraints," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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    • Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2006. "Size and Soft Budget Constraints," Working Papers 2006-13, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
    • Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2006. "Size and soft budget constraints," Discussion Papers 172, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Emmanuel Abuelafia & Sergio Berensztein & Miguel Braun & Luciano di Gresia, 2005. "Who Decides on Public Expenditures? A Political Economy Analysis of the Budget Process: The Case of Argentina," Public Economics 0511004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2003. "Time Inconsistency and Free-Riding in a Monetary Union," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000084, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Miguel Braun & Luciano di Gresia, 2004. "Towards Effective Social Insurance in Latin America: The Importance of Countercyclical Fiscal Policy," Public Economics 0410001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2003. "On the desirability of fiscal constraints in a monetary union," Staff Report 330, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Noel, Michel, 2000. "Building subnational debt markets in developing and transition economies : a framework for analysis, policy reform, and assistance strategy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2339, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  7. Miguel Braun & Luciano di Gresia, 2003. "Hacia un sistema de seguro social eficaz en América Latina: la importancia de una política fiscal anticíclica," RES Working Papers 4334, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  8. Miguel Braun & Luciano di Gresia, 2003. "Towards Effective Social Insurance in Latin America: The Importance of Countercyclical Fiscal Policy," RES Working Papers 4333, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2008. "Size, Spillovers and Soft Budget Constraints," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  10. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2005. "Is it is or is it ain't my obligation? Regional debt in a fiscal federation," Working Papers 05-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
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