This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behavior insurance versus aggregate discipline

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Sanguinetti, Pablo
Tommasi, Mariano

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V6D-4961XWV-1/2/c632cb2e10e4a1abe36d9b050b7a80f6
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 62 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 149-170
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:62:y:2004:i:1:p:149-170

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2006. "Size and Soft Budget Constraints," Working Papers 2006-13, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Emmanuel Abuelafia & Sergio Berensztein & Miguel Braun & Luciano di Gresia, 2005. "Who Decides on Public Expenditures? A Political Economy Analysis of the Budget Process: The Case of Argentina," Public Economics 0511004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. José Bercoff & Osvaldo Meloni, 2009. "Federal budget allocation in an emergent democracy: evidence from Argentina," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 65-83, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Montiel, Peter & Serven, Luis, 2004. "Macroeconomic stability in developing countries - How much is enough?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3456, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Gonzalez, Christian Y. & Rosenblatt, David & Webb, Steven B., 2002. "Stabilizing intergovernmental transfers in Latin America : a complement to national/subnational fiscal rules?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2869, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Marco Bassetto, 2009. "The Research Agenda: Marco Bassetto on the Quantitative Evaluation of Fiscal Policy Rules," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), April. [Downloadable!]
  7. Bilin Neyapti & Nida Cakir, 2007. "Does Fiscal Decentralization Promote Fiscal Discipline?," Departmental Working Papers 0708, Bilkent University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Besfamille, Martin & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "Are Hard Budget Constraints for Sub-National Governments Always Efficient?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 717, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Sebastian M. Saiegh & Mariano Tommasi, 1999. "Why is Argentina’s Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 169-209, May. [Downloadable!]
  10. Emanuel Kohlscheen, 2008. "Debt Bailouts and Constitutions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 862, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2008. "Size, Spillovers and Soft Budget Constraints," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  12. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2005. "Is it is or is it ain't my obligation? Regional debt in a fiscal federation," Working Papers 05-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS indexes over 800000 items of research in Economics alone.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.