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Fiscal Rules and Federalism as Determinants of Budget Performance

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  • Isabel Argimón
  • Pablo Hernández de Cos

Abstract

This article analyses the role of different potential determinants on the fiscal results of the Spanish regions (RGs). The empirical analysis suggests several conclusions. First, the fiscal rule in force between 1992 and 1998 does not appear to have had a significant effect on the fiscal balances of the autonomous regions. With regard to the degree of fiscal autonomy, a higher level in this variable is associated with a more disciplined behavior by RGs. The results also show that the greater transfer of tax revenues to the RGs, associated with a greater devolution of power, has generated greater dependency of fiscal performance on the economic cycle. There is also a strong inertial component in the implementation of fiscal policy in RGs.

Suggested Citation

  • Isabel Argimón & Pablo Hernández de Cos, 2012. "Fiscal Rules and Federalism as Determinants of Budget Performance," Public Finance Review, , vol. 40(1), pages 30-65, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:40:y:2012:i:1:p:30-65
    DOI: 10.1177/1091142110386212
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    4. Agustín Molina†Parra & Diego Martínez†López, 2018. "Do Federal Deficits Motivate Regional Fiscal (Im)Balances? Evidence For The Spanish Case," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 224-258, January.
    5. Salvador Barrios & Diego Martínez-López, 2017. "Fiscal equalization schemes and subcentral government borrowing," Chapters, in: Naoyuki Yoshino & Peter J. Morgan (ed.), Central and Local Government Relations in Asia, chapter 4, pages 130-160, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Venturini, Fiorenza, 2020. "The unintended composition effect of the subnational government fiscal rules: The case of Italian municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    7. Fiorenza Venturini, 2018. "The Unintended Composition Effect of the Subnational Government Fiscal Rules: The Case of Italian Municipalities," Working papers 70, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    8. David Bartolini & Agnese Sacchi & Simone Salotti & Raffaella Santolini, 2018. "Fiscal Decentralization in Times of Financial Crises," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 64(3), pages 456-488.
    9. Javier J. Pérez & Rocío Prieto, 2014. "The structure of sub-natural public debt: Liquidity vs credit risk," Working Papers 1403, Banco de España.
    10. Borge, Lars-Erik & Hopland, Arnt O., 2020. "Less fiscal oversight, more adjustment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    11. Javier J. Pérez & Rocío Prieto, 2015. "Risk Factors and the Maturity of Subnational Debt," Public Finance Review, , vol. 43(6), pages 786-815, November.
    12. Pirvu, Daniela & Dutu, Amalia & Enachescu, Carmen, 2019. "Analysing Of Government'S Fiscal Behaviour In The Eu Member States Through Clustering Procedure," UTMS Journal of Economics, University of Tourism and Management, Skopje, Macedonia, vol. 10(1), pages 23-39.
    13. Heinemann, Friedrich & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Yeter, Mustafa, 2018. "Do fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy? A meta-regression-analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 69-92.
    14. Lenuta Cojocariu & Florin Oprea, 2020. "Fiscal Consolidation and Economic Crisis – Ten Years After," Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, Ovidius University of Constantza, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 0(1), pages 866-882, August.
    15. Nakatani, Ryota, 2023. "Revenue Decentralization and the Probability of a Fiscal Crisis: Is There a Tipping Point for Adverse Effects?," MPRA Paper 119032, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    17. Arturo Melián-González, 2021. "The Expenditure Rule in the Spanish Organic Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability and its Impact on the Autonomous Communities," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 237(2), pages 57-84, June.

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