Mariano Tommasi () (Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andrés) Mark P. Jones (Department of Political Science, Michigan State University) Pablo Sanguinetti (Department of Economics, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)
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We posit that the fiscal behavior of Argentine provinces is determined by a common pool game at two levels: within each province, and across political units. In the latter game, the national government has a greater incentive than the provincial governments to internalize the negative externality of fiscal imprudence. Given relatively strong party discipline, the president is able to induce governors from his party to internalize a portion of the externality to a greater extent than opposition governors. In Argentina “party matters” for fiscal behavior, but it does so for reasons different from those identified in studies of OECD countries.
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Paper provided by Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia in its series Working Papers with number
16.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism