National Insurance Against Unevenly Distributed Shocks in a European Monetary Union
AbstractWe examine proposals to introduce in the European Community national insurance against unevenly distributed shocks. This would operate differently from tax and government spending activities that now yield regional insurance within countries, since the latter are mainly designed for other purposes such as income redistribution and general revenue-raising. According to our evidence, the appeal of such insurance is very limited because the risks are too highly correlated and there is an excessive chance that a country in difficulty would not receive aid. The costs of a continuing programme are likely to exceed the benefits.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 697.
Date of creation: Sep 1992
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- Jacques MÉLITZ & Silvia VORI, 1993. "National Insurance against Unevenly Distributed Shocks in a European Monetary Union," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1993014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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