This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2004-10-21 (All new papers)
• NEP-LAM-2004-10-21 (Central & South America)
• NEP-PBE-2004-10-21 (Public Economics)

1. J. E. King, 1999. "Introduction," Review of Political Economy, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 251-255, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Mariano Tommasi & Guillermo Mondino & Federico Sturzenegger, 1995. "Recurrent High Inflation and Stabilization: A Dynamic Game," Working Papers 10, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Nov 1996.
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3. von Hagen, Jurgen & Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 134-38, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Gonzalez, Christian Y. & Rosenblatt, David & Webb, Steven B., 2002. "Stabilizing intergovernmental transfers in Latin America : a complement to national/subnational fiscal rules?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2869, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
5. James M. Poterba & Kim S. Rueben, 1997. "State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S. Municipal Bond Market," NBER Working Papers 6237, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • James M. Poterba & Kim Rueben, 1999. "State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S. Municipal Bond Market," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 181-208 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
6. J. Schuster, 1999. "Introduction," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-2, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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9. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
10. J. D. Craig & George Kopits, 1998. "Transparency in Government Operations," IMF Occasional Papers 158, International Monetary Fund.
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Cited by:
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1. Emmanuel Abuelafia & Sergio Berensztein & Miguel Braun & Luciano di Gresia, 2005. "Who Decides on Public Expenditures? A Political Economy Analysis of the Budget Process: The Case of Argentina," Public Economics 0511004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
2. Roy Bahl & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2005. "India: Fiscal Condition of the States, International Experience,and Options for Reform: Volume 2," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper05142, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Roy Bahl & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2005. "India: Fiscal Condition of the States, International Experience,and Options for Reform: Volume 1," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper05141, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
3. Uña, Gerardo & Bertello, Nicolas, 2007. "Situacion Fiscal y Fondo Anticiclico en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires: evolucion y perspectivas
   [Fiscal Situation and Stabilization Fund of Buenos Aires City: evolution and forecast]," MPRA Paper 3198, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
4. Miguel Braun & Luciano di Gresia, 2003. "Hacia un sistema de seguro social eficaz en América Latina: la importancia de una política fiscal anticíclica," RES Working Papers 4334, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
5. Miguel Braun & Luciano di Gresia, 2003. "Towards Effective Social Insurance in Latin America: The Importance of Countercyclical Fiscal Policy," RES Working Papers 4333, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
6. Webb, Steven B., 2004. "Fiscal responsibility laws for subnational discipline : the Latin American experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3309, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]