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Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments. Some organizing principles and Latin American experiences

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Author Info
Miguel Braun (CIPPEC)
Mariano Tommasi (Universidad de San Andres)

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate the logic and the workings of fiscal rules, with focus on rules for subnational governments. We argue against a simplistic view that sees the writing of numerical limits on fiscal variables as the solution to fundamental fiscal problems. We suggest that international organizations should take a more comprehensive approach when dealing with the fiscal problems of developing countries. Such an approach requires a deep understanding of the determinants of undesirable fiscal outcomes in each particular case, which in turn requires some explicit political analysis.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0410004.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 14 Oct 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0410004

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 41
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Keywords: fiscal rules fiscal policy

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H - Public Economics

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. J. E. King, 1999. "Introduction," Review of Political Economy, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 251-255, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. von Hagen, Jurgen & Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 134-38, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gonzalez, Christian Y. & Rosenblatt, David & Webb, Steven B., 2002. "Stabilizing intergovernmental transfers in Latin America : a complement to national/subnational fiscal rules?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2869, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. James M. Poterba & Kim S. Rueben, 1997. "State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S. Municipal Bond Market," NBER Working Papers 6237, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. J. Schuster, 1999. "Introduction," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-2, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Suzanne Kennedy & Janine Robbins, . "The Role of Fiscal Rules in Determining Fiscal Performance," Working Papers-Department of Finance Canada 2001-16, Department of Finance Canada. [Downloadable!]
  7. Mondino, Guillermo & Sturzenegger, Federico & Tommasi, Mariano, 1996. "Recurrent High Inflation and Stabilization: A Dynamic Game," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 981-96, November.
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  8. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. J. D. Craig & George Kopits, 1998. "Transparency in Government Operations," IMF Occasional Papers 158, International Monetary Fund.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Emmanuel Abuelafia & Sergio Berensztein & Miguel Braun & Luciano di Gresia, 2005. "Who Decides on Public Expenditures? A Political Economy Analysis of the Budget Process: The Case of Argentina," Public Economics 0511004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Roy Bahl & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2005. "India: Fiscal Condition of the States, International Experience,and Options for Reform: Volume 1," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper05141, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Uña, Gerardo & Bertello, Nicolas, 2007. "Fiscal Situation and Stabilization Fund of Buenos Aires City: evolution and forecast," MPRA Paper 3198, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Webb, Steven B., 2004. "Fiscal responsibility laws for subnational discipline : the Latin American experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3309, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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