On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Working Papers with number 589.
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Staff Report 330
Other versions of this item:
- Chari, V.V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 2007. "On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2399-2408, November.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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