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Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform

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Author Info
Mariano Tommasi (Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andrés & Center of Studies for Institutional Development)
Sebastián M. Saiegh (New York University & Center of Studies for Institutional Development)
Pablo Sanguinetti (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia in its series Working Papers with number 32.

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Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2001
Date of revision: May 2001
Publication status: Published in Economia, Journal of the Latina American and Caribbean Economic Association, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 2001, pages 147-201
Handle: RePEc:sad:wpaper:32

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Related research
Keywords: fiscal; federalism; Argentina; policies; politics; institutions;

Cited by:
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  1. Pablo Sanguinetti & Martin Besfamille, 2004. "Exerting local tax effort or lobbying for central transfers?: Evidence from Argentina," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 249, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gonzalez, Christian Y. & Rosenblatt, David & Webb, Steven B., 2002. "Stabilizing intergovernmental transfers in Latin America : a complement to national/subnational fiscal rules?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2869, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Guriev, Sergei & Yakovlev, Evgeny & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2008. "Interest Group Politics in a Federation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6671, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ruben Enikolopov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," Working Papers w0065, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson & Yunyong Thaicharoen, 2002. "Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth," NBER Working Papers 9124, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-6.


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