1. Uhlig, Harald, 2002. "One Money, but Many Fiscal Policies in Europe: What Are the Consequences?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3296, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Uhlig, H., 2002. "One money, but many fiscal policies in Europe : what are the consequences?," Discussion Paper 32, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Papers 630, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   • Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, . "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Working Papers 121, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
   • Persson, Torsten & Tabellini , Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Seminar Papers 630, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
   • Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," NBER Working Papers 6329, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. van Aarle, Bas & Lans Bovenberg, A. & Raith, Matthias G., 1997. "Is there a tragedy of a common central bank? A dynamic analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 417-447. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2001. "The Optimality of a Monetary Union without a Fiscal Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(2), pages 179-204, May.
   Other versions:
   • Beetsma, Roel & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1998. "The Optimality of a Monetary Union Without a Fiscal Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Buiter, Willem H & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "`Excessive Deficits': Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht," CEPR Discussion Papers 750, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Buiter, W.H. & Corsetti, G. & Roubini, N., 1992. "Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsence in the Treaty of Maastricht," Papers 674, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
8. Lieven Baele & Annalisa Ferrando & Peter Hördahl & Elizaveta Krylova & Cyril Monnet, 2004. "Measuring financial integration in the euro area," Occasional Paper Series 14, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
9. Lorenzo Cappiello & Robert F. Engle & Kevin Sheppard, 2006. "Asymmetric Dynamics in the Correlations of Global Equity and Bond Returns," Journal of Financial Econometrics, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(4), pages 537-572. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kevin Sheppard & Robert F. Engle & Lorenzo Cappiello, 2003. "Asymmetric dynamics in the correlations of global equity and bond returns," Working Paper Series 204, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
10. Pagano, Marco & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2004. "The European Bond Markets Under EMU," CEPR Discussion Papers 4779, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Marco Pagano & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2004. "The European Bond Markets under EMU," CSEF Working Papers 126, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
    • Marco Pagano, 2004. "The European Bond Markets under EMU," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(4), pages 531-554, Winter.
11. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall. [Downloadable!]
13. Restoy, Fernando, 1996. "Interest rates and fiscal discipline in monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 1629-1646, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, L., 1995. "Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation," Discussion Paper 112, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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    • Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Does Monetary Unification Lead to Excessive Debt Accumulation?," DELTA Working Papers 95-23, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    • Beetsma, Roel & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1995. "Does Monetary Unification Lead to Excessive Debt Accumulation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1299, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 1999. "Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 299-325, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers," DELTA Working Papers 95-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    Other versions:
    • Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, L., 1995. "Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers," Discussion Paper 59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • Beetsma,Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg,A. Lans, 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Research Memoranda 024, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    • Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Leith, Campbell & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 2000. "Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C93-108, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Huber, Gerald & Kocher, Martin & Sutter, Matthias, 2003. " Government Strength, Power Dispersion in Governments and Budget Deficits in OECD-Countries: A Voting Power Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 333-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Chang, Roberto, 1990. "International coordination of fiscal deficits," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 347-366, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Artis, Michael J & Winkler, Bernhard, 1997. "The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the Credibility of the European Central Bank," CEPR Discussion Papers 1688, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 2001. "Good, Bad or Ugly? On the Effects of Fiscal Rules with Creative Accounting," CEPR Discussion Papers 2663, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 2000. "Good, Bad or Ugly? On The Effects of Fiscal Rules with Creative Accounting," IMF Working Papers 00/172, International Monetary Fund.
    • Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 2004. "Good, bad or ugly? On the effects of fiscal rules with creative accounting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 377-394, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Canzoneri, Matthew B. & Diba, Behzad T., 1991. "Fiscal deficits, financial integration, and a central bank for Europe," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 381-403, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Neumeyer, Pablo Andres, 1998. "Currencies and the Allocation of Risk: The Welfare Effects of a Monetary Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 246-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Neumeyer, P.A., 1995. "Currencies and the Allocation of Risk: The Welfare Effect of a Monetary Union," DELTA Working Papers 95-27, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
23. Lorenzo Codogno & Carlo Favero & Alessandro Missale, 2003. "Yield spreads on EMU government bonds," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 18(37), pages 503-532, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. Dixit, Avinash, 2001. "Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 589-613, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
25. Arnold, Ivo & Lemmen, Jan, 2001. "The Vulnerability of Banks to Government Default Risk in the EMU," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(1), pages 101-25, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Ivo J. M. Arnold & Jan J.G. Lemmen, 1999. "The Vulnerability of Banks to Government default risk in the EMU," FMG Special Papers sp115, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Ford, Robert & Laxton, Douglas, 1999. "World Public Debt and Real Interest Rates," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 77-94, Summer.
    Other versions:
    • Robert Ford & Douglas Laxton, 1995. "World Public Debt and Real Interest Rates," IMF Working Papers 95/30, International Monetary Fund.
27. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 2001. "Labour Markets and Monetary Union: A Strategic Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 541-65, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Cukierman, A. & Lippi, F., 1999. "Labor markets and monetary union : a strategic analysis," Discussion Paper 100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • Alex Cukierman & Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Labor Markets and Monetary Union; a Strategic Analysis," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 365, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    • Cukierman, A. & Lippi, F., 2000. "Labor Markets and Monetary Union: a Strategic Analysis," Papers 365, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
    • Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Labour Markets and Monetary Union: A Strategic Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 2236, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Carsten Detken & Vítor Gaspar & Bernhard Winkler, 2005. "On Prosperity and Posterity: The Need for Fiscal Discipline in a Monetary Union," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 30, Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Carsten Detken & Vítor Gaspar & Bernhard Winkler, 2004. "On prosperity and posterity: the need for fiscal discipline in a monetary union," Working Paper Series 420, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
2. Jerome Creel & Jacques Le Cacheux, 2003. "Inflation divergence and public deficits in a monetary union," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2003-05, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE). [Downloadable!]