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Government Strength, Power Dispersion in Governments and Budget Deficits in OECD-Countries: A Voting Power Approach

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  • Huber, Gerald
  • Kocher, Martin
  • Sutter, Matthias

Abstract

We test for the influence of government strength and dispersion of power among the parties of coalition governments on the size of annual debt accumulation through budget deficits in OECD-countries from 1970 to 1999. Government strength and power dispersion in coalition governments are measured by the Banzhaf index of voting power, respectively the standard deviation of Banzhaf indices of coalition parties. We believe that these are better-suited proxies than most of what has been applied so far. Government strength turns out to be insignificant. However, coalitions with equally strong partners run significantly higher deficits than coalitions with one dominating party. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 116 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (September)
Pages: 333-50

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:116:y:2003:i:3-4:p:333-50

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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Cited by:
  1. Ivo Bischoff & Wolfgang Gohout, 2010. "The political economy of tax projections," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 133-150, April.
  2. Marek Hanusch, 2012. "Coalition incentives for political budget cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 121-136, April.
  3. Gerald Pech, 2004. "Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 1-24, October.
  4. Yesim Kustepeli & Gülcan Önel, 2005. "The Effects of Political Fragmentation on Fiscal Deficits in Turkey," Discussion Paper Series 05/02, Dokuz Eylül University, Faculty of Business, Department of Economics, revised 23 Nov 2005.
  5. Sutter, Matthias, 2003. " The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: An Experimental Study on the Strategic Use of Deficits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 313-32, September.
  6. Ibrahim Tutar & Aysit Tansel, 2011. "An Analysis of Political and Institutional Power Dispersion: The Case of Turkey," ERC Working Papers 1101, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Mar 2011.
  7. Maria Antoinette Silgoner & Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma & Gerhard Reitschuler, 2003. "The Fiscal Smile," IMF Working Papers 03/182, International Monetary Fund.
  8. John Ashworth & Benny Geys & Bruno Heyndels, 2005. "Government Weakness and Local Public Debt Development in Flemish Municipalities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 395-422, August.
  9. Ricardo Nunes & Davide Debortoli, 2011. "Political Disagreement, Lack of Commitment and the Level of Debt," 2011 Meeting Papers 127, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  10. Geys, Benny, 2006. "Government weakness and electoral cycles in local public debt: evidence from Flemish municipalities," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-06, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  11. Maria Silgoner & Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Gerhard Reitschuler, 2004. "The fiscal smile - on the effectiveness and limits of fiscal stabilizers," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 87, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  12. Beetsma, Roel & Vermeylen, Koen, 2002. "The Effect of Monetary Unification on Public Debt and its Real Return," CEPR Discussion Papers 3491, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Ringa Raudla, 2010. "Governing budgetary commons: what can we learn from Elinor Ostrom?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 201-221, December.
  14. John Ashworth & Benny Geys & Bruno Heyndels, 2006. "Everyone likes a winner: An empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 383-405, September.

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