This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Generalized War of Attrition

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Paul Klemperer (Oxford University)
Jeremy Bulow (Stanford University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

[Forthcoming, American Economic Review.] We model a War of Attrition with N+K firms competing for N prizes. If firms must pay their full costs until the whole game ends, even after dropping out themselves (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of other players' actions. If, instead, firms pay no costs after dropping out (as in a natural oligopoly), the field is immediately reduced to N+1 firms. Furthermore, in this limit it is always the K-1 lowest-value firms who drop out in zero time, even though each firm's value is private information to itself.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9901/9901004.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9901004.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 28 Jan 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9901004

Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HPLaserjet4mplus/PostScript; pages: 24 ; figures: none. We never published this piece and now we would like to reduce our mailing and xerox cost by posting it.
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords: War of Attrition Auctions Standards Natural Monopoly Oligopoly Twoness Strategic Independence

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner., 1988. "Coordination through Committees and Markets," Economics Working Papers 8864, University of California at Berkeley.
    Other versions:
  2. Bulow, Jeremy I & Huang, Ming & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Toeholds and Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 1486, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  4. Gul, Faruk & Lundholm, Russell, 1995. "Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 1039-66, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kornhauser, Lewis & Rubinstein, Ariel & Wilson, Charles, 1989. "Reputation and Patience in the 'War of Attrition.'," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 56(221), pages 15-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Casella, Alessandra & Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilisation?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(436), pages 605-19, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Klepper, Steven & Simons, Kenneth L, 1997. "Technological Extinctions of Industrial Firms: An Inquiry into Their Nature and Causes," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 379-460, March.
  8. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages S87-130, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
    Other versions:
  11. Taylor, Curtis R, 1995. "Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 872-90, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Klemperer, P., 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," Economics Papers 1999-w12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    Other versions:
  13. Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1996. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1142, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-60, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
  20. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1994. "Rational Frenzies and Crashes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(1), pages 1-23, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(4), pages 541-68, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2007. "Environmental Innovation, War of Attrition and Investment Grants," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0045, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
  2. Onderstal, S., 2002. "The chopstick auction," Discussion Paper 35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rida Laraki & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "Continuous-time Games of Timing," Discussion Papers 1363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Ihori, Toshihiro & Jun-ichi Itaya, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Fiscal Reconstruction," CIRJE F-Series 97-F-15, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  6. Meland, Frode & Torsvik, Gaute, 2002. "Structural Adjustment and Endogenous Worker Recall Probabilities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  7. Cesar Martinelli & Raul Escorza, 2004. "When Are Stabilizations Delayed? Alesina-Drazen Revisited," Working Papers 0408, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Andreas Park & Lones Smith, 2008. "Caller Number Five and Related Timing Games," Working Papers tecipa-317, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Hongjun Zhong, 2002. "postbid market interaction and auction choice," Microeconomics 0210002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Markus K Brunnermeier & John Morgan, 2004. "Clock Games: Theory and Experiments," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000401, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Chiao, Benjamin & Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 6141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Onderstal, S., 2002. "Socially optimal mechanisms," Discussion Paper 34, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  14. Tobias Kretschmer & Katrin Muehlfeld, 2006. "Co-Opetition and Prelaunch in Standard-Setting for Developing Technologies," CEP Discussion Papers dp0742, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  15. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," NBER Working Papers 5872, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Meland, Frode & Torsvik, Gaute, 2002. "Structural adjustment and endogenous worker recall probabilities," Working paper Series 0206, Department of Economics, University of Bergen. [Downloadable!]
  17. Oliver Kirchkamp,, 2006. "Less fighting than expected — experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0607, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Aner Sela, 2002. "Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu)," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000088, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. Jack Ochs & In-Uck Park, 2005. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  20. Paola Manzini & Clara Ponsati, 2003. "Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict," Game Theory and Information 0311008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Markku Stenborg, 2003. "Waiting for F/OSS: Coordinating the Production of Free/Open Source Software," Discussion Papers 884, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  22. Andreas Park & Lones Smith, 2006. "Caller Number Five: Timing Games that Morph from One Form to Another," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1554, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create a compilation of all publications of a group of people, say alumni of a program, your students or memers of an association.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.