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Is a Conservative Central Banker a (Perfect) Substitute for Wage Coordination?

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Author Info
Nicola Acocella
Giovanni Bartolomeo

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Abstract

In a monetary union, macroeconomic policies are strongly associated with externalities that imply the need for coordination. However, if coordination is not complete, it might be unable to cope with the externalities. This paper investigates different solutions for internalizing policy externalities. In particular, we compare wage coordination to the conservative central banker solution, which the recent literature has found able to impose wage moderation on labor unions. We also discuss some issues related to labor flexibility reforms as a solution for the unemployment problem. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10663-004-0813-9
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Empirica.

Volume (Year): 31 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 281-294
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Handle: RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:31:y:2004:i:2:p:281-294

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Related research
Keywords: Conservative central bank; budget constraints; wage coordination; monetary union;

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  1. Uhlig, Harald, 2002. "One Money, but Many Fiscal Policies in Europe: What Are the Consequences?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3296, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2002. "Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games," Macroeconomics 0207002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Coricelli, Fabrizio & Cukierman, Alex & Dalmazzo, Alberto, 2001. "Economic Performance and Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union with Imperfect Labour and Goods Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2745, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 199-217, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Chau, Nancy H & Kanbur, Ravi, 2003. "On Footloose Industries, Asymmetric Information and Wage Bargaining," CEPR Discussion Papers 4095, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Klaassen, Frank, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Cukierman, A. & Lippi, F., 2000. "Labor Markets and Monetary Union: a Strategic Analysis," Papers 365, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
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  10. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2001. "Wage And Public Expenditure Setting In A Monetary Union," Working Papers 42, Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Bas van Aarle & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans, 2002. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design in the EMU: An Overview," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 321-340, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Soskice, David, 1990. "Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized Countries," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 36-61, Winter.
  13. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1994. " The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 33-46, April.
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  14. Andersen, Torben M. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1986. "Coordination of fiscal and monetary policy under different institutional arrangements," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 169-191. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Bennett T. McCallum & Edward Nelson, 2000. "An Optimizing IS-LM Specification for Monetary Policy and Business Cycle Analysis," NBER Working Papers 5875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers," DELTA Working Papers 95-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
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  17. Soskice, David & Iversen, Torben, 1998. "Multiple Wage-Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(3), pages 110-24, Autumn.
  18. Van Aarle B. & Engwerda J. & Plasmans J., 2001. "Monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the EMU: a dynamic game approach," Working Papers 2001005, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Kehoe, Patrick J, 1989. "Policy Cooperation among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(2), pages 289-96, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Calmfors, Lars, 2001. "Unemployment, Labor Market Reform, and Monetary Union," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 265-89, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Fabrizio Coricelli & Alex Cukierman & Alberto Dalmazzo, 2006. "Monetary Institutions, Monopolistic Competition, Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 108(1), pages 39-63, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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