References listed on IDEAS
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1. Bean, Charles R, 1992. "Economic and Monetary Union in Europe," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 31-52, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Bean, Charles R, 1992. "Economic and Monetary Union in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 722, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," NBER Working Papers 2759, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Alesina, Alberto F & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," CEPR Discussion Papers 269, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Guido Tabellini & Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," UCLA Economics Working Papers 539, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Thomas Krichel & Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 1994. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Credible Inflation Targets or Monetised Debt?," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 9403, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
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   • Thomas Krichel & Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 1996. "Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 28-54, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1997. "Designing fiscal and monetary institutions in a second-best world," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 53-79, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in a Second-Best World," Discussion Paper 47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
7. Levine, Paul L & Pearlman, Joseph, 1992. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under EMU: Credible Inflation Targets or Unpleasant Monetary Arithmetic?," CEPR Discussion Papers 701, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1991. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," CEPR Discussion Papers 519, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Maurice Obstfeld, 1989. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," NBER Working Papers 2869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Maurice Obstfeld and ., 1997. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C97-085, University of California at Berkeley.
9. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
   Other versions:
   • Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 195-225. [Downloadable!]
10. Levine, Paul, 1993. "Fiscal Policy Co-ordination under EMU and the Choice of Monetary Instrument," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(0), pages 1-12, Suppl..
11. Tabellini, Guido, 1986. "Money, debt and deficits in a dynamic game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 427-442, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 403-14, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1991. "A model of currency depreciation and the debt-inflation spiral," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 151-177. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Obstfeld, Maurice, 1990. "A Model of Currency Depreciation and the Debt-Inflation Spiral," CEPR Discussion Papers 431, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, 1988. "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the IndustrialDemocracies," NBER Working Papers 2682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Guy Debelle, 1996. "Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch?," IMF Working Papers 96/1, International Monetary Fund.