This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
The Optimality of a Monetary Union without a Fiscal Union Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Beetsma, Roel M W J
Bovenberg, A Lans
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
The paper explores the case for monetary and fiscal unification. Monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias because the monetary authorities are not able to commit. With international risk-sharing, fiscal discipline suffers from moral hazard. An inflation target alleviates the inflation bias but weakens fiscal discipline. In a monetary union, however, this adverse effect on fiscal discipline is weaker. This advantage of monetary unification may outweigh the disadvantage of not being able to employ monetary policy to stabilise country-specific shocks. While monetary unification may thus be optimal, international risk-sharing may be undesirable because it weakens fiscal discipline.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download . To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking .
Volume (Year): 33 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 179-204
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:33:y:2001:i:2:p:179-204Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Klaassen, Frank, 2001.
"Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable? ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Franc Klaassen, 2001.
"Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable? ,"
IMF Working Papers
01/178, International Monetary Fund.
[Downloadable!] Roel Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Franc Klaassen, 2001.
"Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable? ,"
HEI Working Papers
04-2001, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
[Downloadable!] Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Klaassen, Franc, 2001.
"Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable? ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Hubert Kempf & Leopold von Thadden, 2008.
"On policy interactions among nations. When do cooperation and commitment matter? ,"
Working Paper Series
880, European Central Bank.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Leopold von Thadden & Hubert Kempf, 2008.
"On Policy Interactions Among Nations: When Do Cooperation and Commitment Matter? ,"
Working Papers
2008.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[Downloadable!] Hubert Kempf & Leopold Von Thadden, 2008.
"On policy interactions among nations : when do cooperation and commitment matter ? ,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
halshs-00344773_v1, HAL.
[Downloadable!] Hubert Kempf & Leopold von Thadden, 2008.
"On policy interactions among nations : when do cooperation and commitment matter ? ,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
v08071, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
[Downloadable!] Hubert Kempf & Leopold von Thadden, 2008.
"On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter? ,"
Working Paper
2008-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
[Downloadable!] Østrup, Finn, 2005.
"Fiscal Policy and Welfare under Different Exchange Rate Regimes ,"
Working Papers
2005-1, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
[Downloadable!]
Uhlig, Harald, 2002.
"One Money, but Many Fiscal Policies in Europe: What Are the Consequences? ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3296, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Matteo Governatori & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2004.
"Fiscal and Monetary Interaction: The Role of Asymmetries of the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Peter CLAEYS, 2004.
"Monetary and budgetary policy interaction: an SVAR analysis of stabilisation policies in monetary union ,"
Economics Working Papers
ECO2004/22, European University Institute.
[Downloadable!]
Thierry Warin, 2005.
"The Hidden Structural Features of the Fiscal Rule: A European Saga ,"
International Advances in Economic Research ,
Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 29-38, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Østrup, Finn, 2006.
"The Choice of Monetary Regime ,"
Working Papers
2005-2, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
[Downloadable!]
repec:bep:glecon:5:2007:1:6 is not listed on IDEAS
Alex Cukierman & Alberto Dalmazzo, 2006.
"Fiscal-monetary policy interactions in the presence of unionized labor markets ,"
International Tax and Public Finance ,
Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 411-435, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Xavier Debrun & Francesca Castellani, 2001.
"Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions ,"
IMF Working Papers
01/205, International Monetary Fund.
[Downloadable!]
Samir Jahjah, 2001.
"Financial Stability and Fiscal Crises in a Monetary Union ,"
IMF Working Papers
01/201, International Monetary Fund.
[Downloadable!]
Roel Beetsma & Koen Vermeylen, 2005.
"The Effect of Monetary Unification on Public Debt and its Real Return ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Beetsma, Roel & Vermeylen, Koen, 2002.
"The Effect of Monetary Unification on Public Debt and its Real Return ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3491, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Roel Beetsma & Koen Vermeylen, 2007.
"The effect of monetary unification on public debt and its real return ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 393-415, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Ridhwan, M.M. & Nijkamp, P. & Rietveld, P. & Groot, H.L.F. de, 2008.
"Regional development and monetary policy : a review of the role of monetary unions, capital mobility and locational effects ,"
Serie Research Memoranda
0007, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? Use the JEL tree to browse through the database by subfields.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-12.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .