Strategic debt accumulation in a heterogeneous monetary union
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 19 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544
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