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Strategic debt accumulation in a heterogeneous monetary union

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  • Beetsma, Roel M. W. J.
  • Bovenberg, A. Lans

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 19 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 1-15

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:19:y:2003:i:1:p:1-15

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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References

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  1. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 2001. "Labour Markets and Monetary Union: A Strategic Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 541-65, July.
  2. Carl E. Walsh, 1994. "Is New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 an optimal central bank contract?," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 94-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  3. Dixit, Avinash, 2001. "Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 589-613, May.
  4. Levine, Paul L & Pearlman, Joseph, 1992. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under EMU: Credible Inflation Targets or Unpleasant Monetary Arithmetic?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 701, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  6. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 977-987, May.
  7. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1995-112, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 65-113, 04.
  9. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  10. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Jensen, Henrik, 1994. "Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 763-779.
  12. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Renate Ohr & André Schmidt, 2006. "Handelbare Verschuldungsrechte zur Sicherung fiskalischer Stabilität in der Währungsunion?," Departmental Discussion Papers, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics 128, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  2. Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Tirelli Patrizio, 2007. "The macroeconomics of social pacts," wp.comunite, Department of Communication, University of Teramo 0028, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  3. Bodo Herzog, 2004. "Warum verstoßen vorwiegend die großen EWU-Länder gegen den Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt?: Eine theoretische Beweisaufnahme," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(3), pages 405-417.

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