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Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union

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  • Beetsma, Roel M W J
  • Bovenberg, A Lans

Abstract

This paper explores the conditions under which a European Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currency area. The scope for an EMU increases with the convergence of structural and fiscal policies, small money holdings, a conservative European Central Bank, and dependent national central banks. How national policies affect the rest of the union once the EMU has been established is also investigated. The case for surveillance of national structural and fiscal policies appears to depend mainly on the monetary arrangements in the union. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Beetsma, Roel M W J & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2000. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 247-269, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:102:y:2000:i:3-4:p:247-69
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    Cited by:

    1. Jürgen von Hagen & Susanne Mundschenk, 2003. "Fiscal and monetary policy coordination in EMU," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(4), pages 279-295.
    2. Di Gioacchino, Debora & Ginebri, Sergio & Sabani, Laura, 2004. "Political support to public debt repudiation in a Monetary Union - the role of the geographical allocation of debt," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp04019, University of Molise, Department of Economics.
    3. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August.
    4. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2000. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 247-269, March.
    5. Uhlig, Harald, 2002. "One Money, but Many Fiscal Policies in Europe: What Are the Consequences?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3296, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Jürgen von Hagen & Susanne Mundschenk, 2002. "Koordinierung der Geld- und Fiskalpolitik in der EWU," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 71(3), pages 325-338.
    7. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    8. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2009. "The macroeconomics of social pacts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 202-213, October.
    9. Bodo Herzog, 2020. "Whither Coronabonds? The Past and Future of the EMU in the Coronavirus Pandemic," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 55(3), pages 155-159, May.
    10. Michel Beine & FréDéric Docquier, 1998. "A Stochastic Simulation Model of an Optimum Currency Area," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 229-257, July.
    11. Amélie Barbier-Gauchard & Meixing Dai & Claire Mainguy & Jamel Saadaoui & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Isabelle Terraz & Jamel Trabelsi, 2021. "Towards a more resilient European Union after the COVID-19 crisis," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 11(2), pages 321-348, June.
    12. Sergey Merzlyakov, 2012. "Strategic Interaction Between Fiscal and Monetary Policies in an Export-Oriented Economy," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 59(2), pages 201-216, May.
    13. Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S., 2002. "One Money, But Many Fiscal Policies in Europe : What are the Consequences?," Other publications TiSEM f2cdcc6c-329f-4ae6-915b-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Brigitte Godbillon & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2001. "Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 163-179, April.
    15. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2007. "Fiscal leadership and central bank design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(2), pages 607-627, May.
    16. van Aarle, Bas & Huart, Florence, 1999. "Monetary and fiscal unification in the EU: a stylized analysis," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 49-66, January.
    17. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2008. "Sustainable fiscal policies and budgetary risk under alternative monetary policy arrangements," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 1-28, March.
    18. Boyer, Robert, 1998. "An essay on the political and institutional deficits of the Euro. The unanticipated fallout of the European Monetary Union," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9813, CEPREMAP.
    19. Heipertz, Martin, 2003. "The Stability and Growth Pact - Not the best but better than nothing. Reviewing the debate on fiscal policy in Europe's Monetary Union," MPIfG Working Paper 03/10, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    20. Laurent GAGNOL & Moise SIDIROPOULOS, 2001. "The policy mix in a monetary union under alternative policy institutions and asymmetries," Working Papers of BETA 2001-23, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    21. Amélie Barbier-Gauchard & Meixing Dai & Claire Mainguy & Jamel Saadaoui & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Isabelle Terraz & Jamel Trabelsi, 2020. "Towards a more resilient European Union after the COVID-19 crisis," Working Papers hal-03008144, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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