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Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under EMU: Credible Inflation Targets or Unpleasant Monetary Arithmetic?

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Author Info
Levine, Paul L
Pearlman, Joseph

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Abstract

The paper emphasizes the distinction between the purely fiscal reasons for fiscal policy coordination under EMU (given a credible low-inflation policy by the ECB), and the spillover effects of an uncoordinated fiscal policy on monetary policy. The worst scenario is where an independent ECB sets the common interest rate and responds to a rising government debt/GDP ratio in either of the two `countries' with a looser monetary stance. The result is high inflation, high debt/GDP ratios and a large public sector. In our intermediate scenario the ECB sets the nominal interest rate and the fiscal authorities bear sole responsibility for their own solvency. The result again, is an excessively large public sector, but government debt is contained and inflation is kept low. In these first two scenarios fiscal policy coordination (with an independent ECB) is counterproductive. The best scenario occurs with credible inflation targeting by the ECB. This removes the incentive for the fiscal authorities to cause surprise inflation. Welfare gains from fiscal coordination now exist but are only substantial in a two-good EMU.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 701.

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Date of creation: Aug 1992
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:701

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Related research
Keywords: EMU; Fiscal Policy Coordination; Monetary/ Fiscal Policy Interdependence; Reputation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

Cited by:
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  1. Backhaus,Jürgen G., 1996. "Good economics, bad economics, and European economics," Research Memoranda 006, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. Beetsma,Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg,A. Lans, 1995. "The role of public debt in the game of double chicken," Research Memoranda 025, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  3. Beetsma,Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg,A. Lans, 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Research Memoranda 024, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. W. Bolt, 1999. "Fiscal Restraints, ECB Credibility and the Stability Pact:A Game-Theoretic Perspective," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 38, Netherlands Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, L., 1995. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Discussion Paper 58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Beetsma,Roel M.W.J., 1996. "The Interaction of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Balancing Credibility and Flexibility," Research Memoranda 005, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in a Second-Best World," Discussion Paper 47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, L., 1995. "Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation," Discussion Paper 112, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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