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Handelbare Verschuldungsrechte zur Sicherung fiskalischer Stabilität in der Währungsunion?

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Author Info
Renate Ohr () (University of Goettingen)
André Schmidt () (University of Goettingen)

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Abstract

Der europäische Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt zählt zu den zentralen Pfeilern der Europäischen Währungsunion. Die Erfahrungen der letzten Jahre zeigen jedoch, dass seine disziplinierende Wirkung zur Begrenzung übermäßiger Defizite in Zweifel zu ziehen ist. Auf der Basis des von Ronald Coase geforderten Denkens in „institutionellen Alternativen“ wird im folgenden Papier die Einführung handelbarer Verschuldungsrechte in der Europäischen Währungsunion diskutiert. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass handelbare Verschuldungsrechte sowohl aus politökonomischer als auch aus allokationstheoretischer Sicht dem bisherigen Regelungen des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes überlegen sind und eine höhere Anreizkompatibilität zur Verhinderung übermäßiger Defizite garantieren. The Stability and Growth Pact is one of the constituent pillars of the European Monetary Union. Though, meanwhile it is obvious that it will not be able to limit fiscal deficits of the member states. For this reason in this paper Coase’s thinking in institutional alternatives is applied to find a better way to increase the incentives for more fiscal stability. We present and discuss tradable deficit permits comprising market-orientated incentives for fiscal stability. It is shown that tradable deficit permits are superior from a politico-economical view as well as with regard to allocative efficiency.

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Paper provided by University of Goettingen, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Discussion Papers with number 128.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:got:vwldps:128

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Keywords: Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt; Handelbare Verschuldungsrechte; Währungsunion; Stability and Growth Pact; Tradable Deficit Permits; Monetary Union;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Uhlig, Harald, 2002. "One Money, but Many Fiscal Policies in Europe: What Are the Consequences?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3296, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Marco Buti & Gabriele Giudice, 2002. "Maastricht's Fiscal Rules at Ten: An Assessment," Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(5), pages 823-848, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 2003. "Strategic debt accumulation in a heterogeneous monetary union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-15, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Woodford, Michael, 2001. "Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(3), pages 669-728, August.
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  6. Jerome Creel & Henri Sterdyniak, 2002. "The fiscal theory of the price level and sluggish inflation: how important shall the wealth effect be?," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2002-01, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE). [Downloadable!]
  7. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. CASTRO, Rui & RESENDE, Carlos & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2003. "The Backing of Government Debt and the Price Level," Cahiers de recherche 2003-22, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
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  9. J. de Haan & H. Berger & D. Jansen, 2003. "The end of the stability and growth pact?," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 748, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Michael Woodford, 1995. "Price Level Determinacy Without Control of a Monetary Aggregate," NBER Working Papers 5204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Renate Ohr & André Schmidt, 2004. "Regelgebundene versus diskretionäre Wirtschaftspolitik: das Beispiel des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(3), pages 381-391.
  12. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 1999. "Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 299-325, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Wyplosz, Charles, 1991. "Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy Discipline," CEPR Discussion Papers 488, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Sascha Wolff, 2006. "Migration und ihre Determinanten im ost-westdeutschen Kontext nach der Wiedervereinigung: Ein Literaturüberblick," Departmental Discussion Papers 130, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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