The purpose of this paper is to exmine more formally the problem of optimal design of an employment insurance program and provide some estimates of the potential grains that could result from its adoption.
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Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number
421.
Length: 28 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:421
Contact details of provider: Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, HARKNESS 231 ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A.
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