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Voters as Fiscal Liberals: Incentives and Accountability in Federal Systems

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  • Mark P. Jones
  • Osvaldo Meloni
  • Mariano Tommasi

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics & Politics.

Volume (Year): 24 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (07)
Pages: 135-156

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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:24:y:2012:i:2:p:135-156

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985

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Cited by:
  1. Ardanaz, Martín & Leiras, Marcelo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2014. "The Politics of Federalism in Argentina and its Implications for Governance and Accountability," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 26-45.
  2. Laura Bianchini & Federico Revelli, 2011. "Green polities: urban environmental performance and government popularity," Working Papers 2011/18, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  3. Maria Teresa Balaguer-Coll & María Isabel Brun-Martos & Anabel Forte & Emili Tortosa-Ausina, 2014. "Determinants of local governments'­ reelection: New evidence based on a Bayesian approach," Working Papers 2014/06, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
  4. Stephan Litschig & Kevin Morrison, 2012. "Government Spending and Re-election: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities," Working Papers 515, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Martin Ardanaz & Marcelo Leiras & Mariano Tommasi, 2012. "The Politics of Federalism in Argentina: Implications for Governance and Accountability," Research Department Publications 4781, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  6. Meloni, Osvaldo, 2011. "Budget Manipulation and Vertical Fiscal Imbalance," MPRA Paper 50694, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Daniel Lema & Jorge M. Streb, 2013. "Ciclos electorales en política fiscal," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 514, Universidad del CEMA.
  8. Julien Labonne, 2012. "The local electoral impacts of conditional cash transfers: Evidence from a field experiment," CSAE Working Paper Series 2012-09, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
  9. Meloni, Osvaldo, 2012. "Is there an electoral-motivated crime rate cycle? Evidence from Argentina," MPRA Paper 40177, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Linda Gonçalves Veiga, 2012. "Voting functions in the EU-15," NIPE Working Papers 16/2012, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
  11. Jakob Haan & Jeroen Klomp, 2013. "Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 387-410, December.
  12. Julien Labonne, 2012. "The local electoral impacts of conditional cash transfers Evidence from a field experiment," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2012-09, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

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