Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Does Opportunism Pay Off?

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

This article tests the hypothesis that the opportunistic manipulation of financial accounts by mayors increases their chances of re-election. Working with a large and detailed dataset comprising all Portuguese mainland municipalities, which covers the municipal elections that took place from 1979 to 2001, we clearly show that increases in investment expenditures and changes in the composition of spending favouring highly visible items are associated with higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors seeking re-election. Our results also indicate that the political payoff to opportunistic spending increased after democracy became well-established in the country.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2006/NIPE_WP_5_2006.PDF
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by NIPE - Universidade do Minho in its series NIPE Working Papers with number 5/2006.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nip:nipewp:5/2006

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas, Escola de Economia e Gestão, Universidade do Minho, P-4710-057 Braga, Portugal
Phone: +351-253604510 ext 5532
Fax: +351-253601380
Email:
Web page: http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/versao_inglesa/index_uk.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: Voting functions; opportunism; local governments; elections; Portugal.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Francisco Jose Veiga & Linda Goncalves Veiga, 2004. "Popularity functions, partisan effects, and support in Parliament," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 101-115, 03.
  2. Adi Brender & Allan Drazen, 2004. "Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies," NBER Working Papers 10539, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2005. "Electoral Manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 11085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Linda Veiga & Francisco Veiga, 2007. "Political business cycles at the municipal level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 45-64, April.
  5. Francisco José Veiga & Linda Gonçalves Veiga, 2001. "The determinants of vote intentions in Portugal," NIPE Working Papers 6/2001, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
  6. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in A Young Democracy Setting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1301-1338, November.
  7. Peltzman, Sam, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 327-61, May.
  8. Rogoff, Kenneth & Sibert, Anne, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16, January.
  9. Veiga, Linda G. & Veiga, Francisco Jose, 2007. "Does opportunism pay off?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 177-182, August.
  10. Coelho, Cesar & Veiga, Francisco Jose & Veiga, Linda G., 2006. "Political business cycles in local employment: Evidence from Portugal," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 82-87, October.
  11. Kenneth Rogoff, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Frey, Bruno S & Schneider, Friedrich, 1978. "An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 174-83, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Akihiko Kawaura, 2010. "Self-Serving Mayors and Local Government Consolidations in Japan," Working Papers 201014, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  2. Sergio Sakurai & Naercio Menezes-Filho, 2008. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 301-314, October.
  3. da Cruz, Nuno Ferreira & Marques, Rui Cunha, 2014. "Revisiting the determinants of local government performance," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 91-103.
  4. Margarita Katsimi & Vassilis Sarantides, 2013. "Public Investment and Re-election Prospects in Developed Countries," Working Papers 2013004, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
  5. Veiga, Linda G. & Veiga, Francisco Jose, 2007. "Does opportunism pay off?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 177-182, August.
  6. Linda Gonçalves Veiga, 2012. "Voting functions in the EU-15," NIPE Working Papers 16/2012, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
  7. Caseette, Aurélie & Farvaque, Etienne, 2013. "Are Elections Debt Brakes? Evidence from French Municipalities," MPRA Paper 48808, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Bianchini Laura & Revelli Federico, 2011. "Green Polities: Urban Environmental Performance and Government Popularity," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201104, University of Turin.
  9. Stephan Litschig & Kevin Morrison, 2012. "Government Spending and Re-election: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities," Working Papers 515, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  10. Lucie Sedmihradská & Rudolf Kubík & Jakub Haas, 2011. "Political Business Cycle in Czech Municipalities," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2011(1), pages 59-70.
  11. Arvate, Paulo Roberto & Avelino, George & Tavares, José, 2009. "Fiscal conservatism in a new democracy: "Sophisticated" versus "naïve" voters," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 125-127, February.
  12. Marika Cioffi & Giovanna Messina & Pietro Tommasino, 2012. "Parties, institutions and political budget cycles at the municipal level," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 885, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  13. Jerome Creel & Etienne Farvaque, 2009. "The political economy of balanced-budget rules," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2009-06, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nip:nipewp:5/2006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Maria João Thompson).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.