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Constitutions and Economic Policy

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Author Info
Torsten Persson
Guido Tabellini

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 18 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (Winter)
Pages: 75-98
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:18:y:2004:i:1:p:75-98

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?," NBER Working Papers 6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
    Other versions:
  3. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1121-1161, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 209-232 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Andrei Shleifer & Simeon Djankov & Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez de Silanes, 2003. "The New Comparative Economics," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm355, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Peltzman, Sam, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 327-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 403-14, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2002. "The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-16, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies?," NBER Working Papers 10176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1993. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," NBER Working Papers 4575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Reza Baqir, 2002. "Districting and Government Overspending," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1318-1354, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini & Francesco Trebbi, 2003. "Electoral Rules and Corruption," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 958-989, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Andres Velasco, 1999. "A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 37-58 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  16. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
    Other versions:
  17. David Austen-Smith, 2000. "Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1235-1269, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Torsten Persson, 2003. "Consequences of Constitutions," NBER Working Papers 10170, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
    Other versions:
  20. Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, 1988. "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the IndustrialDemocracies," NBER Working Papers 2682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Robert Deacon & Sarani Saha, 2005. "Public Good Provision by Dictatorships: A Survey," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 02-05, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mwangi S. Kimenyi, 2005. "Economic Rights, Human Development Effort and Institutions," Working papers 2005-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Eduardo Wiesner Durán, 2007. "La efectividad en términos de desarrollo de las instituciones multilaterales bajo restricciones de acción colectiva," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 9(17), pages 23-42, July-Dece. [Downloadable!]
  4. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Do Electoral Cycles Differ Across Political Systems?," Working Papers 232, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
  5. James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint," NBER Working Papers 12133, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Christian Bjørnskov & Axel Dreher & Justina A. V. Fischer, 2005. "The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world," Economics working paper series 05/44, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Olper, Alessandro & Raimondi, Valentina, 2009. "Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 50304, World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Amavilah, Voxi Heinrich, 2008. "Flags, Constitutions, and the well-being of nations," MPRA Paper 11368, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Dennis Mueller, 2005. "Constitutional political economy in the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 57-73, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Torsten Persson, 2001. "Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?," NBER Working Papers 8214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2006. "Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000706, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Robert Deacon, 2009. "Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 241-262, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Heckelman, Jac & Knack, Stephen, 2005. "Foreign aid and market-liberalizing reform," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3557, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Amavilah, Voxi Heinrich, 2009. "National identity, globalization, and the well-being of nations," MPRA Paper 14948, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  15. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2005. "Socially Optimal Districting," NBER Working Papers 11462, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. R. Coats, 2006. "Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government: Fiscal Choices and Economic Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 233-237, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Bandeira, Pablo, 2008. "La relación entre las instituciones y el desarrollo económico de las naciones
    [The relationship between institutions and economic development]    ," MPRA Paper 13371, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  18. Michael Reksulak, 2006. "The economic effects of constitutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 235-240, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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