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Political Stability and Fiscal Policy - Time Series Evidence for the Swiss Federal Level since 1849 Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Lars P. Feld ()
Christoph A. Schaltegger ()
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This paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy choices in a time-series ana-lysis over 158 years on the Swiss federal level. We argue that the fiscal-commons problem of public finances is affected by the time-horizon of a finance minister. Arguably, the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger the longer the time-horizon of a respective term. In addition, a finance minister who succeeds to stay a long time in office normally enjoys a politically powerful position towards the parlia-ment, the administration and the interest groups to influence policy decisions. In contrast, fre-quent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister.
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 2691.
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Date of creation: 2009Date of revision:
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Keywords: political stability ; fiscal policy ; constitutional changes ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
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