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Fiscal performance and the re-election of finance ministers–evidence from the Swiss cantons

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Listed:
  • Aurélia Buchs

    (University of Lausanne)

  • Nils Soguel

    (University of Lausanne)

Abstract

Using data from 225 cantonal government elections over the 1980–2019 period in Switzerland, we estimate the effect of fiscal performance on the vote share of finance ministers seeking re-election. Our estimations show that finance ministers benefit statistically and electorally from balancing fiscal accounts and presenting budget surpluses. Improving the fiscal balance by 1000 Swiss francs per inhabitant in the pre-election year raises the electoral result of a finance minister by 1.4–5.4 percentage points from the vote share of her previous election. We present evidence for politician-specific monitoring: the finance minister—in contrast to the spending ministers—seems to be the sole member of government who benefits, electorally, from debt reduction. Correcting for possible selection phenomena, our results suggest that the electoral effect of fiscal performance may not be caused by a selection bias but rather by the office of the finance ministry itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Aurélia Buchs & Nils Soguel, 2022. "Fiscal performance and the re-election of finance ministers–evidence from the Swiss cantons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 31-49, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:191:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-021-00949-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-021-00949-z
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal performance; Electoral accountability; Finance minister; Multi-seat majority elections;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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