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The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries

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Author Info
Mark Hallerberg (Department of Political Science, Emory University, 1555 Dickey Drive Atlanta, GA 30322, USA)
Rolf Strauch (b) European Central Bank, Kaiserstr. 29, 60311 Frankfurt a.M., Germany)
Jürgen von Hagen (Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik, University of Bonn, CEPR, and Indiana University, Walter-Flex-Str. 3, 53113 Bonn, Germany, Tel: +49 228 73 9199, vonhagen@uni-bonn.de)

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Abstract

This paper uses a new data set on budgetary institutions in Europe to examine the impact of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries on public finances. It briefly describes the main pattern of budgetary institutions and their determinants across the EU 15 member states. Empirical evidence for the time period 1985-2004 suggests that the centralisation of budgeting procedures restrains public debt. In countries with one-party governments or coalition governments where parties are closely aligned and where political competition among them is low, this is achieved by the delegation of decision-making power to the minister of finance. Fiscal contracts that require countries to set multi-year targets and that reinforce those targets increase fiscal discipline in countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions and where parties regularly compete against each other.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number 150.

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Date of creation: Jun 2006
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Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:150

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Related research
Keywords: public indebtedness budgetary procedures fiscal rules European public finances

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  2. Holger Gleich, 2003. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Central and Eastern European countries," Working Paper Series 215, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Kiewiet, D Roderick & Szakaly, Kristin, 1996. "Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 62-97, April.
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  7. Arreaza, A. & Sorensen, B.E. & Yosha, O., 1997. "Consumption Smoothing Through Fiscal Policy in OECD and EU Countries," Papers 37-97, Tel Aviv.
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  8. Alberto Alesina & Ricardo Hausmann & Rudolf Hommes & Ernesto Stein, 1996. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America," NBER Working Papers 5586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, 1988. "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the IndustrialDemocracies," NBER Working Papers 2682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Volkerink, Bjorn & De Haan, Jakob, 2001. " Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(3-4), pages 221-42, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Álvaro Pina & Nuno Venes, 2007. "The Political Economy of EDP Fiscal Forecasts: An Empirical Assessment," Working Papers 2007/23, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon.. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ludger Schuknecht, 2004. "EU fiscal rules: issues and lessons from political economy," Working Paper Series 421, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Philipp Paulus, 2006. "The final blow to the Stability Pact? EMU enlargement and government debt," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 03/2006, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland. [Downloadable!]
  4. Niamh Hardiman & Patrick Murphy & Orlaith Burke, 2008. "Legitimating Fiscal Stabilization: Ireland in Comparative Perspective," Working Papers 200813, Geary Institute, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
  5. Hallerberg, Mark & Wolff, Guntram B., 2006. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,35, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ian Lienert, 2007. "British Influence on Commonwealth Budget Systems: The Case of the United Republic of Tanzania," IMF Working Papers 07/78, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  7. Candelon Bertrand & Muysken Joan & Vermeulen Robert, 2007. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe: An Update," Research Memoranda 050, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  8. Anthony Annett, 2006. "Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How Fiscal Policy Did and Did Not Change Under Europe's Fiscal Framework," IMF Working Papers 06/116, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  9. Paulo Roberto Arvate & Marcos Felipe Mendes Lopes, 2007. "Institutional Changes, Incentive Schemes And The Decision To Undertake Fiscal Adjustments," Anais do XXXV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 35th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 010, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
  10. Ashoka Mody & Stefania Fabrizio, 2008. "Breaking the Impediments to Budgetary Reforms: Evidence from Europe," IMF Working Papers 08/82, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  11. Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Heipertz, Martin & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2006. "Expenditure reform in industralised countries : a case study approach," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-50, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Macedo, Jorge Braga de, 2007. "A mudança do regime cambial português: Um balanço 15 anos depois de Maastricht," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp502, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
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