Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule
AbstractThe paper considers the case for fiscal restrictions like the Excessive Deficits Procedure of the Maastrict Treaty and the origin of borrowing restrictions in the U.S. and Australia
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers with number C95-056.
Date of creation: 01 Sep 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA
Web page: http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/iber/wps/ciderwp.htm
More information through EDIRC
Postal: IBER, F502 Haas Building, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley CA 94720-1922
Other versions of this item:
- Eichengreen, Barry & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," CEPR Discussion Papers 1247, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
- H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.