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Fiscal restrictions and monetary union: Rationales, repercussions, reforms

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  • Barry Eichengreen
  • Jürgen Hagen

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Empirica.

Volume (Year): 23 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 3-23

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Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:23:y:1996:i:1:p:3-23

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100261

Related research

Keywords: Maastricht Treaty; Excessive Deficit Procedure; EMU; E61; H60; H87;

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References

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  1. Bertola, Giuseppe & Drazen, Allan, 1993. "Trigger Points and Budget Cuts: Explaining the Effects of Fiscal Austerity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 11-26, March.
  2. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jurgen & Waller, Christopher J, 1997. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 378-93, April.
  3. Buiter, Willem H & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "`Excessive Deficits': Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht," CEPR Discussion Papers 750, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Ricardo Hausmann & Alberto Alesina & Rudolf Hommes & Ernesto H. Stein, 1998. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America," Research Department Publications 4160, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  5. repec:sae:niesru:v:145:y::i:1:p:43-63 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Alesina, A. & Prati, A. & Tabellini, G., 1989. "Public Confidence And Debt Management: A Model And A Case Study Of Italy," Papers, California Los Angeles - Applied Econometrics 5, California Los Angeles - Applied Econometrics.
  7. Fratianni, M. & Von Hagen, J. & Waller, C., 1992. "The Maastricht Way to EMU," Princeton Studies in International Economics, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University, 187, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
  8. Rockoff, Hugh, 1974. "The Free Banking Era: A Reexamination," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(2), pages 141-67, May.
  9. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Vines, David, 1991. "Adjustment Difficulties within a European Monetary Union: Can They be Reduced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 517, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Rolnick, Arthur J & Weber, Warren E, 1983. "New Evidence on the Free Banking Era," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 1080-91, December.
  11. Robert Holzmann & Yves Hervé & Roland Demmel, 1996. "The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?," Empirica, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 25-58, February.
  12. Eichengreen, Barry & Ghironi, Fabio, 1995. "European Monetary Unification: The Challenges Ahead," CEPR Discussion Papers 1217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-61, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Easterly, William, 1999. "When is fiscal adjustment an illusion?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2109, The World Bank.
  2. Rodden, Jonathan, 2003. "Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(04), pages 695-729, September.
  3. Waltraud Schelkle, 2010. "Good Governance in Crisis or a Good Crisis for Governance? A Comparison of the EU and the US," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series, European Institute, LSE 16, European Institute, LSE.
  4. Barry Eichengreen & Ricardo Hausmann & Jürgen Von Hagen, 1999. "Reforming Budgetary Institutions in Latin America: The Case for a National Fiscal Council," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 415-442, October.
  5. Robert Holzmann & Yves Hervé & Roland Demmel, 1996. "The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?," Empirica, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 25-58, February.
  6. Jürgen Von Hagen, 1999. "Macroeconomic Consequences of the EMU," Empirica, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 359-374, December.

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