On The Sources Of The Inflation Bias And Output Variability
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2005.00358.x
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- Gustavo Piga, 2005. "On the Sources of the Inflation Bias and Output Variability," CEIS Research Paper 66, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Hayat, Zafar & Balli, Faruk & Rehman, Muhammad, 2017. "The relevance and relative robustness of sources of inflation bias in Pakistan," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 283-303.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
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