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Reforming Budgetary Institutions in Latin America: The Case for a National Fiscal Council

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Author Info
Barry Eichengreen
Ricardo Hausmann
Jürgen Von Hagen

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Abstract

Latin America's economies have made tremendous improvements in recent years. Following the lost decade of the 1980s, economic growth has resumed. But the fruits of this progress remain to be consolidated. The political consensus supporting reform is fragile, and the economies of the region are still susceptible to destabilizing shocks, as recent events have underscored. Even well-devised economic policy strategies can be thrown off course by disturbances. This article proposes an institutional reform—a National Fiscal Council—designed to allow Latin American countries to break out of this vicious circle. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1008337818753
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review.

Volume (Year): 10 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 415-442
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Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:10:y:1999:i:4:p:415-442

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Related research
Keywords: the commons problem; fiscal policy; institutional reforms;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Ricardo Hausmann & Alberto Alesina & Rudolf Hommes & Ernesto H. Stein, 1998. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America," RES Working Papers 4160, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Buiter, Willem H & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "`Excessive Deficits': Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht," CEPR Discussion Papers 750, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
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  6. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1994. "Monetary policy in economic transition: Lessons from the French post-war experience," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 891-898, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Eichengreen, Barry & Bayoumi, Tamim, 1994. "The political economy of fiscal restrictions: Implications for Europe from the United States," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 783-791, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ezequiel Cabezon & Tej Prakash, 2008. "Public Financial Management and Fiscal Outcomes in sub-Saharan African Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries," IMF Working Papers 08/217, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alberto Alesina & Tamim Bayoumi, 1996. "The Costs and Benefits of Fiscal Rules: Evidence from U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 5614, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ashoka Mody & Stefania Fabrizio, 2006. "Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline?," IMF Working Papers 06/123, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Michael Gavin & Ricardo Hausmann & Roberto Perotti & Ernesto Talvi, 1996. "Managing Fiscal Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Volatility, Procyclicality, and Limited Creditworthiness," RES Working Papers 4032, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. Miguel Braun & Mariano Tommasi, 2004. "Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments. Some organizing principles and Latin American experiences," Public Economics 0410004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. P R Agénor & D Yilmaz, 2006. "The Tyranny of Rules: Fiscal Discipline, Productive Spending, and Growth," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 73, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
  7. Michael Gavin, 1997. "A Decade of Reform in Latin America: Has it Delivered Lower Volatility?," RES Working Papers 4076, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  8. Krogstrup, Signe & Wyplosz, Charles, 2006. "A Common Pool Theory of Deficit Bias Correction," CEPR Discussion Papers 5866, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Velasco, A., 1999. "Policy Responses to Currency Crises," Working Papers 99-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  10. Ernesto Stein & Ernesto Talvi & Alejandro Grisanti, 1998. "Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: The Latin American Experience," NBER Working Papers 6358, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Michael Gavin & Ricardo Hausmann & Roberto Perotti & Ernesto Talvi, 1996. "Gestión de la política fiscal en América Latina y el Caribe: volatilidad, propensión a los ciclos y solvencia limitada," RES Working Papers 4033, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  12. Charles Wyplosz, 2002. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions vs. Rules," HEI Working Papers 03-2002, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies. [Downloadable!]
  13. Barry Eichengreen & Lucas D. Papademos, 2003. "The Future of the European Growth and Stability Pact," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(2), pages 68-77, October. [Downloadable!]
  14. Holger Gleich, 2003. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Central and Eastern European countries," Working Paper Series 215, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  15. George Kopits, 2007. "Fiscal Responsibility Framework: International Experience and Implications for Hungary," MNB Occasional Papers 2007/62, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (The Central Bank of Hungary). [Downloadable!]
  16. Joaquín Vial & Cristobal Aninat & John Landregan & Patricio Navia, 2006. "Instituciones políticas, procesos de diseño de políticas y resultados de las políticas en Chile," RES Working Papers 3223, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  17. Lars Calmfors & Giancarlo Corsetti & John Flemming & Seppo Honkapohja & John Kay & Willi Leibfritz & Gilles Saint-Paul & Hans-Werner Sinn & Xavier Vives, 2003. "Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stabilisation in the Euro Area: Possible Reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact and National Decision-Making-Processes," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo Group Munich, vol. 0, pages 46-75, 05. [Downloadable!]
  18. Michael Gavin, 1997. "Una década de reformas en América Latina: ¿Ha producido una menor inestabilidad?," RES Working Papers 4077, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  19. Joaquín Vial & Cristobal Aninat & John Landregan & Patricio Navia, 2006. "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes in Chile," RES Working Papers 3222, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  20. Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro, 2005. "Has the Stability and Growth Pact Stabilised? Evidence from a Panel of 12 European Countries and Some Implications for the Reform of the Pact," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. M S Mohanty & Michela Scatigna, 2003. "Countercyclical fiscal policy and central banks," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Fiscal issues and central banking in emerging economies, volume 20, pages 38-70 Bank for International Settlements. [Downloadable!]
  22. Jorge M. Streb, 1999. "Reelection or term limits? The short and the long view of economic policy," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 144, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]
  23. Andrés VELASCO, 2000. "Exchange-Rate Policies For Developing Countries: What Have We Learned? What Do We Still Not Know?," G-24 Discussion Papers 5, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. [Downloadable!]
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