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Fiscal Transparency And Policy Rules In Poland

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  • Rafal Benecki

    (ING Bank and Queen Mary College, University of London)

  • Jens Hölscher

    (Brighton Business School, University of Brighton)

  • Mariusz Jarmuzek

    (CASE and Queen Mary College, University of London)

Abstract

This paper assesses the current stance and desirable progress in the implementation of fiscal transparency and rules in Poland. An index of transparency based on Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), with some modifications, is also constructed in this paper, followed by proposals for making transparency and fiscal rules more efficient within Poland’s fiscal policy. This study attempts to answer the following questions: Firstly, to what extent is fiscal policy transparent in the context of the standards set by the EU’s regulations and the IMF’s ROSC? Secondly, have the fiscal rules adopted by Poland proved to be successful in establishing fiscal policy discipline? Finally, what still needs to be changed to make both transparency and fiscal rules more efficient for the conduct of fiscal policy? To set the work in context we also provide an overview of recent advances in both the theoretical and empirical literature on fiscal transparency and rules.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EUROPE,School of Slavonic and East European Studies,University College London (SSEES,UCL) in its series Working Papers with number 65.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2006
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Handle: RePEc:see:wpaper:65

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  1. George Kopits & Helge Berger & István P. Székely, 2004. "Fiscal Indulgence in Central Europe," IMF Working Papers 04/62, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Tanzi,Vito & Schuknecht,Ludger, 2000. "Public Spending in the 20th Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521662918.
  3. James M. Poterba, 1996. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Policy in the U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 5449, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. James M. Poterba, 1996. "Do Budget Rules Work?," NBER Working Papers 5550, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1996. "Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions," NBER Working Papers 5556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Roubini, Nouriel, 1996. "European versus American Perspectives on Balanced-Budget Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 408-13, May.
  7. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-71, October.
  8. Buiter, Willem H, 2001. "Notes on 'A Code for Fiscal Stability.'," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 1-19, January.
  9. Alberto Alesina & Ricardo Hausmann & Rudolf Hommes & Ernesto Stein, 1996. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America," NBER Working Papers 5586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Alt, James E. & Lassen, David Dreyer, 2006. "Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1403-1439, August.
  11. Rankin, N. & Roffia, B., 1999. "Maximum Sustainable Government Debt in the Overlapping Generations Model," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 521, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  12. Oecd, 2001. "OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, OECD Publishing, vol. 1(3), pages 7-14.
  13. Eichengreen, Barry & Bayoumi, Tamim, 1994. "The political economy of fiscal restrictions: Implications for Europe from the United States," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 783-791, April.
  14. James M. Poterba, 1993. "State Responses to Fiscal Crisis: The Effects of Budgetary Institutionsand Politics," NBER Working Papers 4375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Alberto Alesina & Tamim Bayoumi, 1996. "The Costs and Benefits of Fiscal Rules: Evidence from U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 5614, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Mark Hallerberg & Lúcio Vinhas de Souza, 2000. "The Political Business Cycles of EU Accession Countries," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-085/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  17. Levinson, Arik, 1998. "Balanced Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence from the States," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 4), pages 715-32, December.
  18. Suzanne Kennedy & Janine Robbins, . "The Role of Fiscal Rules in Determining Fiscal Performance," Working Papers-Department of Finance Canada, Department of Finance Canada 2001-16, Department of Finance Canada.
  19. Mark Hallerberg & Jurgen von Hagen, 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Working Papers 6341, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. James M. Poterba & Kim Rueben, 1999. "State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S. Municipal Bond Market," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 181-208 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Murray Petrie, 2003. "Promoting Fiscal Transparency the Complementary Roles of the Imf, Financial Markets and Civil Society," IMF Working Papers 03/199, International Monetary Fund.
  22. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1996. "Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 401-07, May.
  23. Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1555, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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