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The debt brake in the eyes of the German population

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  • Bernd Hayo
  • Florian Neumeier

Abstract

In response to the recent sovereign debt crisis, the member states of the European Union agreed to enact balanced budget rules in their national legislation. However, little is known about the public’s opinion of balanced budget rules. To fill this gap, we conducted a survey among 2,000 representatively chosen German citizens. Our findings suggest that 61 % of the German population supports the debt brake, whereas only 8 % oppose it. However, approval rates differ notably among various subgroups of the population. The debt brake enjoys greater support among high-income earners and among those well-informed about the future costs of deficit spending. People who do not trust politicians would like to see the government’s hands tied even more tightly. Opinions about the debt brake also differ markedly across the supporters of different political parties. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Suggested Citation

  • Bernd Hayo & Florian Neumeier, 2016. "The debt brake in the eyes of the German population," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 139-159, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:iecepo:v:13:y:2016:i:1:p:139-159
    DOI: 10.1007/s10368-015-0323-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Dominik Hecker & Dano Meiske & Niklas Potrafke & Marina Riem & Christoph Schinke, 2016. "Debt Caps in German Federal States: Words and Deeds of Federal State Governments," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 69(02), pages 14-22, January.
    2. Blesse Sebastian & Berger Melissa & Heinemann Friedrich & Janeba Eckhard, 2017. "Föderalismuspräferenzen in der deutschen Bevölkerung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 145-158, June.
    3. Hayo, Bernd & Neumeier, Florian, 2017. "The (In)validity of the Ricardian equivalence theorem–findings from a representative German population survey," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 162-174.
    4. García, Israel & Hayo, Bernd, 2021. "Political budget cycles revisited: Testing the signalling process," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    5. Heinemann, Friedrich & Janeba, Eckhard & Todtenhaupt, Maximilian, 2022. "Incumbency and expectations of fiscal rule compliance: Evidence from surveys of German policy makers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    6. Dilla, Diana, 2017. "Staatsverschuldung und Verschuldungsmentalität [Public Debt and Debt Mentality]," MPRA Paper 79432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Niklas Potrafke & Marina Riem & Christoph Schinke, 2016. "Debt Brakes in the German States: Governments’ Rhetoric and Actions," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(2), pages 253-275, May.
    8. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2017. "The debt brake of the German states: a faulty design?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 257-269, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debt brake; Balanced budget rule; European fiscal compact; Survey; Germany; E62; H31; H62; H63;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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