Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America

Contents:

Author Info

  • Stein, Ernesto
  • Hommes, Rudolf
  • Hausmann, Ricardo
  • Alesina, Alberto

Abstract

In this paper, we collect detailed information on the budget institutions of Latin American countries. We classify these institutions on a "hierarchical"/"collegial" scale, as a function of the existence of constraints on the deficit, and voting rules. We show that "hierarchical" and transparent procedures have been associated with more fiscal discipline in Latin America in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4553021/alesina_budgetinstitutions.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard University Department of Economics in its series Scholarly Articles with number 4553021.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Development Economics
Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:4553021

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138
Phone: 617-495-2144
Fax: 617-495-7730
Web page: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Robert E. Lucas Jr. & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy Without Capital," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 532, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Alesina, Alberto & Hausmann, Ricardo & Hommes, Rudolf & Stein, Ernesto, 1999. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 253-273, August.
  3. Bohn, Henning & Inman, Robert P., 1996. "Balanced-budget rules and public deficits: evidence from the U.S. states," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 13-76, December.
  4. Alesina, Alberto & Cukierman, Alex, 1990. "The Politics of Ambiguity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 829-50, November.
  5. Henning Bohn & Robert P. Inman, . "Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States (Reprint 060)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research 10-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  6. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1986. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Ernesto Stein & Ernesto Talvi & Alejandro Grisanti, 1999. "Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: The Latin American Experience," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 103-134 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Eichengreen, B., 1992. "Should the Maastricht Treaty be Saved?," Princeton Studies in International Economics, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University, 74, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
  9. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May.
  10. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1997. "Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries: Composition and Macroeconomic Effects," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 44(2), pages 210-248, June.
  11. Barro, Robert J., 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics 3451400, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  12. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1996. "Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 5556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Andres Velasco, 1997. "A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 6336, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1995. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 1-31, March.
  15. Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, 1989. "Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Economies," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 2919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, 1995. "Restraining Yourself: The Implications of Fiscal Rules for Economic Stabilization," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 32-48, March.
  17. Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, 1988. "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the IndustrialDemocracies," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 2682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 4637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:4553021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ben Steinberg).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.