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A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt

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Marco Battaglini
Steve Coate

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000001094.

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Date of creation: 28 Jan 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001094

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. V.V. Chari & Harold Cole, 1993. "Why are representative democracies fiscally irresponsible?," Staff Report 163, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 84-105, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Inman, Robert P, 1990. "Public Debts and Fiscal Politics: How to Decide?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 81-85, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2090, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Albert Marcet & Thomas J. Sargent & Juha Seppala, 1996. "Optimal Taxation without State-Contingent Debt," Economics Working Papers 170, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2001. [Downloadable!]
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  8. George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "How to play with a biased coin?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 206-226, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006. "Markets Versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000032, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Giancarlo Corsetti & Nouriel Roubini, 1997. "Politically Motivated Fiscal Deficits: Policy Issues in Closed and Open Economies," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(1), pages 27-54, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Alberto Alesina, 2000. "The Political Economy of the Budget Surplus in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 3-19, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Besley, Timothy & Smart, Michael, 2007. "Fiscal restraints and voter welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 755-773, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. John Hassler & José V. Rodríguez Mora & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2001. "The Survival of the Welfare State," Economics Working Papers 603, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Lehrer, E, 1990. "Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games with Semi-standard Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 191-217.
  18. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992. "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis," UCLA Economics Working Papers 676, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2005. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis," Papers 08-09-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Henning Bohn & Robert P. Inman, . "Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States (Reprint 060)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 10-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  22. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," NBER Working Papers 4637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Marco Bassetto & Thomas J Sargent, 2006. "Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1167-1210, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. V.V. Chari & Harold Cole, 1993. "A contribution to the theory of pork barrel spending," Staff Report 156, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  25. Velasco, Andres, 2000. "Debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 105-125, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Neyman, Abraham & Okada, Daijiro, 2000. "Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 228-247, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Policy Persistence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1327-1336, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  28. George-Marios Angeletos, 2002. "Fiscal Policy With Noncontingent Debt And The Optimal Maturity Structure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1105-1131, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. George Mailath & Stephen Morris, . ""Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring''," CARESS Working Papres 99-09, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
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  30. Barro, Robert J, 1986. " U.S. Deficits since World War I," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 88(1), pages 195-22.
  31. Perotti, Roberto & Kontopoulos, Yianos, 2002. "Fragmented fiscal policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 191-222, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-64, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  33. Barro, Robert J., 1987. "Government spending, interest rates, prices, and budget deficits in the United Kingdom, 1701-1918," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 221-247, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  34. von Hagen, Jurgen & Harden, Ian J., 1995. "Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 771-779, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  35. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  36. Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro, 2002. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 40-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  37. Henning Bohn & Robert P. Inman, 1996. "Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 5533, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  38. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1998. "An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 47-76, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  39. Henning Bohn, 1998. "The Behavior Of U.S. Public Debt And Deficits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(3), pages 949-963, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  40. von Stengel, Bernhard & Koller, Daphne, 1997. "Team-Maxmin Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 309-321, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  41. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  42. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  43. Poterba, James M, 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 799-821, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  44. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 403-14, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  45. Lizzeri, Alessandro, 1999. "Budget Deficits and Redistributive Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(4), pages 909-28, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  46. repec:rus:hseeco:72153 is not listed on IDEAS
  47. Niskanen, William A, 1992. "The Case for a New Fiscal Constitution," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 13-24, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  48. Leblanc, William & Snyder, James Jr. & Tripathi, Micky, 2000. "Majority-rule bargaining and the under provision of public investment goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 21-47, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  49. Baron David & Kalai Ehud, 1993. "The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 290-301, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  50. Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 1997. "Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 345-361, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  51. Volkerink, Bjorn & De Haan, Jakob, 2001. " Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(3-4), pages 221-42, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  52. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  53. Piccione, Michele, 2002. "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 70-83, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  54. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  55. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  56. Neyman, Abraham & Okada, Daijiro, 1999. "Strategic Entropy and Complexity in Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 191-223, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," RCER Working Papers 551, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ricardo J. Caballero & Pierre Yared, 2008. "Future Rent-Seeking and Current Public Savings," NBER Working Papers 14417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, 2008. "Political disagreement, lack of commitment and the level of debt," International Finance Discussion Papers 938, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  4. Marsiliani, Laura & Renström, Thomas I, 2007. "Political Institutions and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 6143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Marco Bassetto, 2009. "The Research Agenda: Marco Bassetto on the Quantitative Evaluation of Fiscal Policy Rules," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), April. [Downloadable!]
  6. Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2007. "The dynamics of distributive politics," Working Papers 1273, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "Fiscal Policy over the Real Business Cycle: A Positive Theory," NBER Working Papers 14047, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making," Wallis Working Papers WP45, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  9. Jon H. Fiva & Gisle James Natvik, 2009. "Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Laura Marsiliani & Thomas Renström, 2007. "Political institutions and economic growth," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 233-261, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ilzetzki, Ethan, 2006. "Rent seeing distortions and fiscal procyclicality," MPRA Paper 8726, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Nov 2008. [Downloadable!]
  12. Khemani, Stuti & Wane, Waly, 2008. "Populist fiscal policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4762, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  13. Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "On the 'Faustian' Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Working Papers gueconwpa~08-08-02, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2008. "Political Economy of Ramsey Taxation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002192, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), . "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador, 2009. "Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation," NBER Working Papers 15194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Song, Zheng & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2007. "Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt," Memorandum 05/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Lopez, Ramon & Islam, Asif, 2008. "When Government Spending Serves the Elites: Consequences for Economic Growth in a Context of Market Imperfections," Working Papers 45875, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
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