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Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis

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Author Info
Robert J. Aumann (UCLA)
Lloyd S. Shapley (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp676.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 676.

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Date of creation: 01 Sep 1992
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:676

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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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  1. Robert J. Aumann, 2006. "War and Peace," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000332, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. O. Gossner, 2000. "Sharing a long secret in a few public words," THEMA Working Papers 2000-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  3. Arthur Zillante, 2005. "Spaced Out Monopolies: Theory and Empirics of Alternating Product Releases," Industrial Organization 0505008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Abraham Neyman Null & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Departmental Working Papers 200514, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. O. Gossner, 1999. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," THEMA Working Papers 99-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2002. "Globalization and Cooperative Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3522, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Discussion Paper Series dp411, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Pedro Dal Bo, 2002. "Three Essays on Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000038, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Pedro Dal Bo, 2001. "Social Norms, Cooperation and Inequality," UCLA Economics Working Papers 802, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Yuming Fu & Stephen Ching, 2001. "Examining Competition in Land Market: An Application of Event Study to Land Auctions in Hong Kong," Wisconsin-Madison CULER working papers 01-01, University of Wisconsin Center for Urban Land Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 365, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  13. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  14. Gul, Faruk, 1997. "A Nobel Prize for Game Theorists: The Contributions of Harsanyi, Nash and Selten," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 159-74, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Harrison Cheng, 2000. "Folk Theorem with One-sided Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 338-363, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Dilip Abreu & Prajit K Dutta & Lones Smith, 1997. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 633, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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