We characterize the max min of repeated zero-sum games in which player one plays in pure strategies sonditional on the private observation of a fixed sequence random variables. Meanwhile we introduce a definition of a strategic distance between probability measures, and relate it to the standard Kullbach distance.
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Paper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number
99-31.
Length: 31 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-31
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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